

Confidential filing

UK policy towards conflict

MIDDLE EAST

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SUBJECT CC MASTER

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

19 August 1990

Dear Sir,

IRAQ

Early yesterday evening the Foreign Secretary briefed the Prime Minister on the telephone on his conversation with Secretary James Baker earlier that afternoon. This is to confirm our telephone conversation yesterday in which I reported on the Prime Minister's telephone conversation with the Foreign Secretary. The main points were as follows.

The Foreign Secretary said that the US were pressing to get a formal UN Resolution condemning the Iraqi treatment of foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait. The US were seeking a Resolution which dealt with the question of nationals alone because they realised that a wider Resolution on sea interdiction would be unlikely to succeed at this stage. The Prime Minister recognised the reasons for this approach but commented that a wider Resolution might soon be necessary. The Prime Minister added that it was important to find out more about the Chinese position. She was also concerned about the Indians who, historically, have taken a great deal of Iraq oil.

The Foreign Secretary relayed Mr. Baker's account of President Bush's meeting with King Hussein of Jordan. The feeling of the American Administration was that this meeting had gone well. The US had undertaken to look at ways in which Jordan could be compensated if sanctions were fully applied. The Prime Minister said that it was essential that Jordan should not be allowed to be the breach in the dyke. It was important that no food from Jordan should be sent to Iraq; and the Saudis must be persuaded to provide oil. Giving the Jordanians compensation was a much better solution than allowing Jordan to drive a coach and horses through the UN sanctions. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought King Hussein's main difficulty was less economic than political. Secretary Baker had said that King Hussein's equivocal stance was helping to keep him in power and was not therefore a bad thing. That said, the Foreign Secretary thought that King Hussein was hypnotised by Saddam. He was also very hurt by the Prime Minister's message. The Prime Minister said that we had better let King Hussein know that Saddam will lose - this would be the key psychological message to get across.

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The Foreign Secretary went on to give an account of his conversation with Mr. Baker on the meeting of the Western European Union on Tuesday. He had stressed the importance of harvesting small contributions. It would be important for the US to tread carefully on suggesting that forces should be put under US command. Mr. Baker had understood this. The Prime Minister said that what they should seek is not co-ordination under US command but co-ordination with the US. With that simple change of word many of their difficulties would disappear.

The Prime Minister said that she was concerned by the dilatory way that OPEC was proceeding: why were they holding a meeting next week? - the meeting should be on Monday. It was clear that we would have to put up oil production to whatever is necessary. The Saudis were willing to do so and she gathered the UAE were thinking of doing so too. We must get positive signals on increasing production out of OPEC as soon as possible, she thought.

The position on foreign nationals in Iran and Kuwait was discussed. Both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary agreed that it now seemed highly likely that foreign nationals would be detained at key installations. Saddam Hussain was behaving like Hitler and using psychological warfare. His aim might well be to provoke hostile action. The Prime Minister stressed the importance of the UK studying his psychological warfare tactics carefully and responding in a suitable way. The Foreign Secretary told her that the Foreign Office's psychological warfare department had been re-activated: he was currently studying a paper from the unit. The Prime Minister said that the UK would need to get across loud and clear in broadcasts to Iraq the message that Saddam would lose and that we will carry on long enough to make sure that he does. Another key point was that Saddam had led the Iraqis into a long and costly war with Iran. 100,000 Iraqis lives had been lost and a quarter of a million Iranians had died. All this was for nothing now that Iraq had conceded the territory which had been the point of issue. This proved Saddam was a selfish, despotic dictator.

More generally, we had to get across the point to the domestic and international media that this crisis had happened because this dictator had taken Kuwait by force contrary to international law. The Prime Minister said that she was concerned that commentators were already beginning to lose sight of this fundamental fact. Not just westerners, but streams and streams of other people were leaving Iraq and Kuwait because they feared living under Saddam. We had to stress that the power of self-defence was far older than any UN Resolution - it was important not to get bogged down in talk on the detailed powers available under UN Resolutions.

The Foreign Secretary said that he was beginning to think that the Government should recall Parliament. Cranley Onslow had spoken to him and said that he thought that Parliament would need to be called back soon and the Foreign Secretary saw advantage in not being forced into doing it. The Prime Minister said that she saw his point but that we should get past the immediate crisis on foreign nationals before doing so. The Lord President was away

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and at this stage there was little which could usefully be discussed by Parliament. If there were clashes over blockading that might be different but we should seek to regain the initiative before Parliament was recalled.

I am copying this letter to Tim Sutton (Lord President's Office), Simon Webb (Ministry of Defence), John Gieve (H M Treasury), John Neilson (Department of Energy) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

Caroline

CAROLINE SLOCOCK

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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CC
 23^a (A-^VE)

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

PRIME MINISTER

QATAR - BAHRAIN - ABU DHABI - DUBAI EMIRATES

Prime Minister
 As you suggested,
 I have set up a
 meeting at 9.30
 for Alan Clark to
 brief you. The Foreign
 Secretary and Mr
 King would also
 like to attend.

CHS

19/8

I returned this morning to Brize Norton at 0340 hours to find my personal staff on leave and no typist at MOD so I am particularly grateful for the use of the No. 10 facilities to dictate this text.

I believe the mission was successful in attaining the objective that you set; that is to say of giving your personal regards to the Ruling Families, underlining UK support for them and pointing out the speed and effectiveness of our military response. I believe this opinion to be shared both by Duncan Slater (AUS - FCO) and General Sir Richard Vincent who accompanied me, as well as by the Ambassadors and chargé at the various posts, all of whom responded splendidly to the less than 24 hour notice of my visit. The arrangements were impeccable.

In the interests of brevity I have set out my analysis of the situation and recommendations below, and attach the fuller Meeting Notes (taken by my PS) as a numbered annex.

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1. I have little doubt that the Americans intend to take direct military action as soon as their heavy armour arrives from Norfolk Virginia, about mid-September. If not before.

My grounds for this belief, in ascending order of quality, are:

- a. Chatter in the bazaars.
- b. The sheer scale of the US input. There are now 1,200 beds (three military hospitals) in place, plus such special units such as (a) 'Wild Weasle' electronic counter-measures squadron suitable primarily for deep intrusion. The total of combat aircraft is now over 300.
- c. The opinion, expressed to me in a most interesting talk on the tarmac at Riyadh Military Airport at 2300 hours last night of our Ambassador to Saudi, gleaned from his own contacts.
- d. The opinion of Air Marshal Sandy Wilson (Force Commander) whom I also spoke to at length at Riyadh - who attends the daily briefings called by the Resident US Commander - from conversation with his American counterparts.

2. Both the Ambassador and Wilson expressed to me their concern at being excluded from attending at, or seeing reports of, the strategic - as distinct from tactical - planning process which is evolving rapidly. Sandy Wilson asked particularly that we should have some attendant, in the USA, at the JCS meetings.

(Of course I do not know the extent to which you yourself are privy to this evolution or even if, given the degree of implied consent therein, you would wish to be and I made no comment).

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3. Air Marshal Wilson has made himself widely liked by his USAF counterparts and is already well dug in with the Saudi AF as a result of his earlier tour here training the Tornado pilots. But he believes that our relatively minor contribution is diminishing our claim to full disclosure. He was particularly supportive of my suggestion (incorporated in VCDS flash signal of 16 August to MOD concerning which I telephoned Dominic Morris) that a Squadron GR1 Tornado ground attack aircraft be despatched as soon as practicable. These aircraft have full night attack capability and the Americans have particularly asked for them as this is a capability where they are deficient. I believe this would greatly enhance the status of our contributions in the US (and Arabian) eyes.

4. There remains the broader question of whether or not it is prudent wholly to be identified with US action which, customarily is crude and extravagant; where memories and myth could proliferate to our long-term disadvantage; the extent to which the consequent imbalance would create new problems, enhancement of Israeli and Iranian dominance, anxieties on the part of the Soviet Union, etc. - this is a subject on which you will want to temper expert advice with your own instinct.

I must admit that my own instinct is to go in heavily and urgently. Fear and power are Saddam's principal weapons. When these are stripped from him the streets of other capitals will soon empty of demonstrators. In Arabia, as in many regions, Machiavelli's precept that 'it is better to be feared than loved' holds true.

5. Awareness of this is deeply imbued in the Ruling Families to whom I spoke. All were delighted that you should have instructed me to call on them. All took the view (this is generally accepted lore throughout Arabia), that it was only your fortuitous presence, with the Grace of Allah etc, etc - at Bush's side in Aspen when the crisis broke that ensured such a decisive response.

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All implied, with varying degrees of directness, misgivings as to American resolution over the longer haul and stated their reliance on the UK strengthening this. All agree that Saddam must be eliminated or there could be no 'safety' in the Region.

But I detected a considerable apprehension that the whole situation could go terribly wrong. Not in the sense of the traditional nightmare scenario where superpower conflict follows quarrels between client states; but of a collapse of the existing social order throughout Arabia. A chain reaction of assassinations and displacement. The fate of Nuri El Said murdered by the mob, or of Anwar Sadat shot by his own bodyguard, still cast a shadow.

This explains their relative indifference, when pressed, to the stationing of additional aircraft or accretions to the Fleet's strength. It was requests for 'Ground Forces' that repeatedly emerged during successive private conversations (usually in the car between rendez-vous) as being a wish for infantry, no more than company strength, and light armour, Scorpion and Scimitar to be billeted close to the Amir's Palace "... as a guard against terrorists".

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A squadron of Blues and Royals from the LHR counter terrorist force (Op Trustee) would involve a qualitative enhancement of our presence, and arouse comment. Dick Vincent is examining the possibility that at Bahrain an enhanced RAF Regiment presence, nominally to protect the forward Jaguar deployment, might do the trick.

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6. My Arab hosts expressed particular concerns about access to intelligence. Dick Vincent and I have evolved a scheme whereby a senior officer would do the rounds once a week offering a (of course highly sanitised) intelligence briefing at the highest level.

Dick is satisfied that this could be done without us suffering any inconvenience or violation of our understandings with the US. Certainly it would be very much welcomed and could well give us access to some interesting nuggets of information from those on the visiting list. These visits would also provide a useful entree for the DESO representative (see below) when appropriate.

7. Whatever deployment policies we adopt I must emphasise that this is an unparalleled opportunity for DESO; a vast demonstration range with live ammunition and 'real' trials. We must get into our heads that

- i. ^{supply of} the balance of payments is a more intractable and damaging problem than the military 'Threat' ?
- ii. that armaments are our most successful manufactured export
- iii. that where demonstration, or diversion of existing stocks is resisted on grounds that disruption of existing deployments would imperil our security, the obverse of this argument is now valid. We must be prepared to consider such diversions where large orders could follow. For example the Emirates could take enough Warrior to allow us a penalty-free extraction from our own commitments to GKN. And there is still a lot of real interest in Challenger II (subject, of course, to how MI Abrams stands up in combat conditions). At the end of the Annex I have pencilled a list of current defence sales prospects at the start of the crisis. These are now likely to be brought forward and increased in volume if we do our stuff.

Prime Minister
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available
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8. Finally, I cannot resist referring to certain passages of the Defence Paper which I submitted to you in December. You may think this to be a good illustration of how long-range force projection, speed of response, National prestige and trading advantage can all be closely inter-related.

9. I am copying this note to Douglas Hurd and Tom King.

A

19 August 1990

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MINISTER OF STATE (DEFENCE PROCUREMENT) VISIT TO THE GULF:
15-18 AUGUST 1990

MEETINGS

A	Qatar	Amir (Shaikh Khalifa)
B	Qatar	Chief of Staff (Shaikh Hamad bin Abdullah)
C	Bahrain	Amir (Shaikh Isa)
D	Bahrain	Crown Prince (Shaikh Hamad)
E	Bahrain	Minister of Defence (General Khalifa)
F	UAE - Abu Dhabi	Chief of Staff (General Mohammed said al Badi)
G	Abu Dhabi	President (Shaikh Zayed)
H	UAE - Dubai	Minister of Defence (Shaikh Mohammed bin Rashid)

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ANNEX A

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/70

MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP), SHAIKH KHALIFA BIN HAMAD AL
THANI, THE AMIR OF QATAR, AND SHAIKH HAMAD BIN KHALIFA AL
THANI ON 16 AUGUST 1990

After an exchange of pleasantries, during which Mr Clark delivered the Prime Minister's personal greetings to the Amir and the Amir replied, saying he was an extremely close friend of the Prime Minister, the Amir went into a long description of events at the recent Cairo Summit. He gave details of states which had supported, abstained or opposed action against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Specifically, he said that Libya and the PLO had opposed, Sudan, Yemen, Jordan and Algeria had abstained; and Tunisia had been absent. He criticised Tunisia quite sharply saying that its positive attitude towards Saddam Hussein had been prompted by promises from Saddam that he would support moves to retain the headquarters of the Arab League in Tunis.

2. The Amir continued to criticise other Arab States on the basis that they had accepted bribes from Saddam - some of these bribes to be paid with the wealth of other Gulf States (which he intended to take over) saying at the same time that this wealth rightly belonged to all Arabs. He did not specifically name names, but he clearly was referring to states who had either abstained or voted against the resolution.

3. The Amir went on to criticise Arafat personally and later made the point that the Palestinian populations in certain of the Gulf States were particularly dangerous to their hosts. However, in the case of Kuwait (where he said there was currently a famine developing) he pointed out that many Palestinians were now leaving for Saudi Arabia or Jordan. He said this would turn out to be a good thing for Kuwait once the legitimate government had been restored.

4. The Amir added that he had had many conversations with friendly Heads of State, both Arab and Western. His own evaluation of the very satisfactory and rapid response by the West was that this had been instigated almost entirely by the Prime Minister herself. It was, he said, a great good fortune that Mrs Thatcher had been with President Bush at Aspen at the time of the Iraqi invasion. If she had not moved with such speed, Saddam, who wished to become the King of Oil, would

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have jumped immediately into all the Gulf States. He had embarked on a study of his ancestors in order to prove that he was descended from the Prophet which would legitimise his leadership of the Arab world.

5. The Amir said that he had predicted this crisis and had warned of it; he hoped to take forward his close friendship with the Prime Minister and it was his wish to consult closely with the United Kingdom during a visit to London later this year.

6. The Amir remarked upon Saddam's character and intentions, saying that he had lied to King Hussein and also to President Mubarak and also to the world, particularly in 1980 when, in the Iraqi National Charter, he recommended that no Arab country should ever invade another Arab country. The Amir thought that Saddam was co-operating with Iran simply because he found himself cornered. If there were positive developments in their relationship, this would not be to the world's advantage. It was very essential that the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti Government should take place as soon as possible. The Amir wanted to make clear that it was not simply the leading families of the Gulf but also the ordinary people who demanded this. Those of a contrary view were very few in number - and mostly Palestinian.

7. He asked that the current blockade be total. He also wished us to approach Iran in order to persuade them (even if they reached an agreement with Saddam) to enforce the blockade, which was a UN requirement. Nobody should trust Saddam. The Amir said that, after the end of the Iran/Iraq war, many Gulf Heads of State had visited Baghdad. He himself had been there to attend the Arab Summit but he wanted to emphasise that this had not been a formal visit to the Government of Iraq. Finally, he reiterated his appreciation of the Prime Minister's message.

8. Mr Clark responded that he was most grateful for the Amir's comprehensive resumé of the situation in the Gulf and Qatar's own position. He had found it extremely valuable. He would make sure that his views and the other information were conveyed to the Prime Minister and other appropriate quarters. Mr Clark added that the UK shared Qatar's disappointment that some states had seen fit not to support the general Arab consensus against the Iraqi invasion. He congratulated the Amir on his great vision in predicting the current situation and discerning that the Prime Minister's fortunate presence at Aspen had been crucial in the current Western response. He was glad the Amir had plans to visit London where he would be welcome.

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9. Mr Clark was particularly glad that the Amir clearly felt so strongly that the world should be satisfied with nothing less than the full restoration of the Kuwaiti Government. The Amir intervened at this point to say that GCC members would not believe fully in the friendship offered by the West until the legitimate Government of Kuwait had been restored. The Amir also mentioned here that the Tunisian President had given personal assurances of his support.

10. Mr Clark then went on to support the Amir's remarks about the need for the blockade to be total and for Iran to be kept in line with the UN Resolution. The Amir now interrupted again to ask what action would be taken if the embargo did not achieve the object desired - would we use force? Mr Clark sought the Amir's own personal views on this to which the Amir said he could see no alternative. Mr Clark then asked the Amir two questions. Firstly, whether there was any additional equipment or presence which Qatar would welcome. The Amir responded that this was technical and should be discussed with his Chief of Staff. However, he felt that Qatar was now adequately protected both by bases in the area and by ships in the Gulf. He added that all Qatari facilities would be at the disposal of HM forces in the area. Second, Mr Clark asked specifically whether it would be helpful to the Amir and his very close senior circle, should HMG offer a regular intelligence summary of developments in the region. The Amir accepted this with enthusiasm. He added that Qatar would respond in kind, pointing out that his remarks about the Palestinians leaving the area were being shared with the UK before anybody else.

11. The Amir then sought Mr Clark's views on the role of Syria, saying that the Syrian Vice President was currently in Iran. He also, apparently lightheartedly, asked for legal assistance in ensuring that the large loans that Qatar had made to Iraq were repaid. Mr Clark replied that in some situations a gun was more useful than a lawyer.

12. The Amir then reported on a visit by the French. He said specifically that he found the French attitude equivocal; he had, indeed, made the point that their response had been slow and unsubstantive. At one visit most of the conversation had been devoted to the whereabouts of the KIO balances.

13. At the end of the discussion, the Crown Prince made some remarks about Saddam playing a very dangerous game in that, as a Ba'athist his appeals to Islamic fundamentalists would seem very shallow. He was also in a difficult position reaching agreement with Iran following 8 years of war and suffering. His people would not thank him for this.

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ANNEX B

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/70

MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND COLONEL SHAIKH HAMAD BIN
ABDULLAH AL THANI, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, QATAR ARMED FORCES -
16 AUGUST 1990

After an exchange of greetings, the Chief of Staff asked a number of questions about the visit itself and about the intentions of the Western forces (not just the UK forces in the area), and how HMG saw the situation developing. Mr Clark reassured the Chief of Staff about our intentions and made clear that we were happy to listen to any requests for assistance that the Qataris might wish to make. General Sir Richard Vincent then gave the Chief of Staff comprehensive details about the current deployments and possible future options, and our detailed military assessment of Iraq's intentions.

2. The Chief of Staff was clearly concerned about the vulnerability of those forces currently deployed and about our robustness in the face of any possible setbacks or attacks. He stated that we should seize the initiative and attack Saddam himself. He said that his own action had been confined so far to co-ordination with other GCC states; he had not increased training missions. He was also concerned about Iraqi chemical and missile capabilities and the policy of the Iraqis to convert civilian aircraft (which he claimed were still flying on normal routes over the region) to carry weapons.

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4. The conversation then turned to morale on either side. The Chief of Staff said that Iraqi forces in Kuwait were of two types: hardened soldiers, mainly the Republican Guard of whom there were 'up to' four Divisions, who were prepared to die, and very young, frightened and unhappy militiamen who would not be effective in the event of a conflict. He added that a number of Iraqi soldiers, coming from the North of Iraq, were suffering in the heat as much as Western forces would be. Saddam had underestimated the loyalty of the Kuwaiti internal opposition to the legitimate Kuwaiti Government; he had also underestimated the immediate response of the West to his invasion. The Chief of Staff thought, however, that Saddam Hussein would aim for stalemate and hope the Western Forces would become demoralised and go away.

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ANNEX C



MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/1/8

August 1990

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE HONOURABLE ALAN CLARK,
MINISTER(DP) AND HIS HIGHNESS SHAIKH ISA, THE AMIR OF
BAHRAIN

1. After an initial exchange of greetings during which Mr Clark delivered the Prime Minister's message and personal regards (warmly received and reciprocated), the Amir immediately launched into a review of the situation, which he thought very serious. He emphasised his disappointment that there had been no earlier response from HMG to his exchange of messages with the Prime Minister at the beginning of the crisis. He added that he was still thinking that HMG would help; to include the deployment of land forces, if possible. He was particularly keen that the British should be present in Bahrain because of the long friendship between the two countries. He reminded the Minister that the Royal Navy had already been made welcome.

2. Mr Clark responded that we had already deployed two squadrons of aircraft including those within 3 minutes of Bahrain in Saudi Arabia. The Jaguar squadron was presently in Oman, where it had been sent because of the pre-existing facilities there for Jaguar aircraft; the Amir would be aware that the Omanis operated Jaguars of their own. The Minister added that, in two weeks' time, when the assembly of naval forces was complete, we would have 11 ships in total in the Gulf area. These included fleet support ships which would not only enable us to send more combat ships should the need arise, but would also be carrying helicopters. There were also Royal Marines with close range missiles aboard these ships.

3. Mr Clark then made a specific request of the Amir that we should be allowed to rotate (ie to station for periods) some aircraft in Bahrain. It would be very useful for us to be able to bring aircraft forward in this way. This would of course entail the stationing of some ground forces for maintenance and ground protection. He also asked whether

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the Amir would be content for some Nimrod aircraft to stage through Bahrain. At this point the Amir asked whether these proposals were agreed by HMG and whether Mr Clark was empowered to make them. Mr Clark gave the necessary assurance and then introduced VCDS to acquaint the Amir with details of other aspects of our proposals, and operational matters.

4. The Amir listened with great interest and questioned how long it would take for all these proposals to be implemented. On being told "tomorrow", at least for the aircraft, with ground crew following as soon as possible thereafter, the Amir stated categorically that we were invited to place whatever we considered appropriate in Bahrain. At that point the Foreign Minister, Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak, exhibited some hesitation and said that details of such deployments would have to be discussed with the Bahraini armed forces later in the day. These discussions would also have to include equipment needs.

5. The Amir then engaged the Minister in conversation about the situation in Iraq and Kuwait and the attitudes of other countries including the Eastern bloc. He said it was most important that there was a total blockade and the USSR should be as closely associated with it as possible. He also questioned the resolve of HMG in the face of the recent Iraqi assembly of western European citizens and, in referring to the Falkland Islands, he wondered whether this situation was sufficiently difficult for the West to be deterred from any strike which may in due course become necessary. Mr Clark said that we kept all our options open but the UK was foremost in rejecting the notion that hostages could force concessions in policy.

6. On closing the meeting the Amir reiterated his regards to the Prime Minister and thanks for this demonstration of close co-operation with Bahrain by HMG.

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ANNEX D

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/9

MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND SHAIKH HAMAD BIN ISA AL KHALIFA, THE CROWN PRINCE OF BAHRAIN - 17 AUGUST 1990

Following an exchange of greetings in which Mr Clark referred to the Amir's request in the previous session to UK air and further naval deployments to Bahrain, the Crown Prince reiterated that, while Bahrain fully understood the concept of existing deployments adequately covering the whole Gulf, they thought that this time it was important for a number of reasons that there were UK forces in Bahrain itself. He said Bahrain would do everything it could to help the UK in its efforts. (He mentioned in an aside that it was good to think of UK troops returning, it reminded Bahrainis of the Qassem crisis in 1961.)

2. The Crown Prince then mentioned that he had telephoned Prince Sultan and, during the conversation, had told him of Mr Clark's visit and that its purpose was to enquire what additional help was required in the region. Prince Sultan had said the news of Mr Clark's visit was 'wonderful' and he had sent his regards.

3. The Crown Prince then said that Bahrain did not feel far from NATO (though it was not clear whether this was in the geographic or fraternal sense). He said he was looking for strategic co-operation or a MOU on a defence relationship which would go further than the current agreement. The GCC was not yet a deterrent and there were many threats; today Iraq, tomorrow Iran again. If HMG helped Bahrain to help itself, we could have what we liked in return. He wanted not too much and not too little, but definitely not the latter.

4. Mr Clark asked whether any agreements should be public; the Crown Prince confirmed that the fact of them should be - but not the details. It would be a deterrent to aggression, and lack of clarity would enhance the effect. He felt a new agreement would ensure that our response was quicker next time. He wanted all the GCC to co-operate on this. He would announce to the world that it was Bahrain who requested a UK

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military presence. For the time being, however, any reinforcement should be seen as part of the enforcement of the UN resolution. He felt even King Hussein would come around once he had solved his internal difficulties. Iraq must be removed from Kuwait, but the outcome depended on God. Mr Clark questioned whether God would be sympathetic; the Crown Prince said God was on the side of the just.

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ANNEX E

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/9

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND GENERAL KHALIFA
BIN AHMAD AL KHALIFA, BAHRAIN MINISTER OF DEFENCE -
17 AUGUST 1990

1. Mr Clark was given a current intelligence briefing on the situation in Kuwait. General Khalifa welcomed the offer of an exchange of intelligence and asked about the stationing of aircraft. VCDS said a reconnaissance team could be in Bahrain the following day and aircraft a day later. General Khalifa was happy with the arrival of the team but said he would rather wait and see whether aircraft were required. The Americans had just arrived and Bahrain's skies would be full.
2. In offering to ensure that DESO met the Bahrain requirement for NBC suits, VCDS warned against inferior equipment being offered by others. He introduced Major Gardiner who could advise on SF matters and who could be left behind if necessary. He reminded the Minister that the UK stance was essentially defensive and no ground force presence was currently considered, though he invited him to let HMG know of any special reasons for this request for ground forces.
3. General Khalifa emphasised that Bahrain had made a point of requesting "ground forces" because they were aware of their shortcomings and priorities, and this area was their most important shortcoming.
4. Finally, it was agreed that the points of contact for intelligence exchange should be the Chief of Staff and the Defence Minister.

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ANNEX F



R

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/14/1

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER (DP) AND MAJOR GENERAL
MOHAMMED SAID AL BADI, CHIEF OF STAFF, UAE ARMED FORCES - 18
AUGUST 1990

1. The Chief of Staff came to Mr Clark's hotel to accompany him to the President's Palace. He reaffirmed UAE's pleasure at Mr Clark's visit which was extremely timely and important. He was also appreciative of the Prime Minister's initiative in persuading the US and UN to take action.

2. Mr Clark responded by thanking the Chief of Staff for his warm welcome and confirming his impression of the Prime Minister's role. He expressed his contempt for Saddam and his behaviour and emphasised that his threats to Western citizens would not save him from retribution. He added that he was looking forward to seeking the President's views and recounting them to the Prime Minister on his return. He also said that, were any requests made for support or assistance, he would report them immediately.

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21/11/16

4. VCDS then asked the Chief of Staff to investigate a difficulty whereby Dubai was not participating to the necessary degree in Royal Naval training. The Chief of Staff said he had not heard about this but would look into it. He thought the principle should cause no difficulty. VCDS finally mentioned the subject of the staging of Maritime Patrol Aircraft and the Chief of Staff further agreed that this too would be possible.

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ANNEX G

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MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/1/8

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN SHAIKH ZAYED BIN SULTAN AL NAHYAN,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND MINISTER (DEFENCE
PROCUREMENT) - 18 AUGUST 1990

1. Having exchanged greetings, Mr Clark delivered the Prime Minister's message and sought the President's views and advice on the situation.

2. Shaikh Zayed said the UK must always come before all other countries in the UAE's reckoning but he was no longer sure that UAE had been a priority to HMG. Mr Clark hoped that His Highness would accept that the fact of his presence as the Prime Minister's personal emissary was testimony to the great importance and high esteem which HMG attached to the Shaikh and his country. We particularly valued what was said in the earlier exchange of letters between the President and the Prime Minister and had taken this into account in formulations of our operational profile. The President was well satisfied with this reply and volunteered the maxim that "he who has strong relationships with others will always find acceptable excuses for his failings". He felt free to mention his disappointment direct to a good friend but would not be making it public. He went on to affirm that all members of the GCC were agreed on their condemnation of the invasion. Some other countries had been seduced into supporting Saddam but they had been covetous. The Gulf needed nothing from him and knew him to be untrustworthy. His pronouncements changed constantly and he placed no value on support or loyalty. It was impossible to forecast how he could be ousted or how he might react to force; he was irrational. He had spent nine years fighting Iran, destroying in the process the economy of his country and pauperising his people, and yet now he was prepared to make peace.

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ANNEX H

MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT

D/MIN(DP)/AC/1/8

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN MINISTER(DP) AND SHAIKH MOHAMMED BIN RASHID, UAE MINISTER OF DEFENCE - 17 AUGUST 1990

1. Following the customary greeting, Shaikh Mohammed asked where the UAE's oldest friend had been in their hour of need. They had felt forgotten and snubbed but now were glad of Mr Clark's presence. He asked his opinion.

2. Mr Clark emphasised the good fortune of the Prime Minister's presence at Aspen at this critical juncture and his conviction that she would ensure that the present action was carried through to the appropriate conclusion. He was concerned at Saddam's irrational behaviour and felt that no solution could be expected while he survived. Shaikh Mohammed agreed. At the moment, Saddam felt that he could not lose. He would try to raise Arabs everywhere in revolution. Even if he failed gloriously against the West he would be a hero. He was not sure what he had achieved but, to some, he was already one. He no doubt hoped that the US and UK would eventually leave and the Gulf would be his. He had only to wait.

3. Mr Clark said the UK, at least, would not leave while his friends needed her. He reiterated that HMG never made deals over hostages and those detained now would not deflect our resolve. He asked what Shaikh Mohammed's view of Iran was. HMG would like to resolve our differences and improve relations. Any messages to this effect would be helpful. His Highness said that Rafsanjani was a clever and moderate man who should not be judged by what he was obliged to say at present.

4. Mr Clark then asked what the UK could do for UAE. Shaikh Mohammed wondered about intelligence. UAE was not equivocating; Mr Clark had to remember that he was going home that night, the UAE could not leave.

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Mr Clark added that he understood that there was a difficulty about releasing AIM 9L to Dubai. He would take this up with the US. His Highness was again grateful and said there might be numerous other small requests; Mr Clark promised that these would be looked at carefully and sympathetically by the Ambassador.

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ANNEX I

MINISTER OF STATE (DEFENCE PROCUREMENT) VISIT TO THE GULF:
15-18 AUGUST 1990

Defence Sales Prospects

A United Arab Emirates

i Abu Dhabi

ii Dubai

iii Oman

iv Bahrain

B Saudi Arabia

C Egypt

D Jordan

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D/DESS/178/3

7 August 1990

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
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8/8/90

IRAQ/KUWAIT: SALES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Ref your MO 6/17/155 dated 6 August 1990.

Further to my brief earlier today, here is the separate brief promised on major defence sales business currently under discussion or negotiation.



A W H BARRETT

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CURRENT DEFENCE SALES PROSPECTS

The following major defence sales business is currently under discussion or negotiation:

1. UNITED ARAB EMIRATESa) ABU DHABI

- 36 Black Hawk helicopters from Westland. Approx Value £325M.
- Possible supply of 400+ Warrior Desert Fighting vehicles from GKN. [Approx Value £450M]. Warrior hot-weather trial about to commence in Abu Dhabi.
- EW Equipment for UAE Air Force from MEL. Approx Value £15/20M.
- Possible long-term interest in Challenger II tank if adopted by British Army.

b) DUBAI

- Air Defence Package. Missile [Laser Fire] from BAe. Approx Value £50M.
- Radar Command & Control system from Marconi. Approx Value £42M

c) OMAN

- Contract just signed for 16 Hawk aircraft from BAe. Value £224M.
- Ocean Capable Patrol Craft from Vosper Thornycroft. Approx Value £60/80M per vessel. [Bid in at £80M but Oman is looking for a cheaper package].
- Interest in Warrior Desert fighting vehicle. [Trials in 1991]. Approx value £55M
- Interest in 40+ Challenger II tanks if adopted by British Army.

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d) BAHRAIN

- Preliminary consideration of Hawk from BAe. [Numbers and value not yet decided].
- Plessey Radar signed a contract in November 1989 for a Watchman Radar. Value £3.75M
- Contract signed in Dec 1989 for 8 patrol boats from Halmatic for Coast Guard. Value £8M
- Engineering related equipment (bridging, airfield damage repair, EOD etc. Estimated Value £5M

e) QATAR

- Fast strike craft - Vosper Thornycroft pursuing prospect for 3 vessels. Estimated value £75M

2. SAUDI ARABIA [non-Al Yamamah]

- New phase of Communications Project for National Guard. Value £3/400M
- Range of equipment via Minister of Interior for National Security Force and Frontier Force. [Total and value not yet decided]
- British Hovercraft (Westland) have submitted proposals to supply 8 Hovercraft and refurbish 8 others for the Frontier Force. Value £200M
- GKN Sankey are hopeful of securing a contract for 200 Warrior vehicles, with the Saudi Land Forces. Value £200M
- Racal and Plessey are both bidding for a command, control and communication system for the land forces. Value £100M.
- International Hospitals Group have bid for the operation and maintenance of National Guard hospitals in Jeddah and Riyadh. Value £125M.
- International Hospitals Group have also bid for the operation and maintenance of 4 more hospitals. Value £750M
- Vickers Defence Systems are promoting Challenger II to meet the requirement for 300 Main Battle Tanks. Value £250m
- IMS are bidding for a contract to supply NBC equipment. Value £160m.
- Siemens Plessey Defence Systems are pursuing a contract for Electronic Warfare systems. Value £100m

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- Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering are leading a UK bid to set up a hydrographic service in Saudi. This will comprise vessels, training and infrastructure. Value £100m.

3. Egypt

- Sale and refit ex-RN submarines [O-boats]. Maximum of 6 contemplated. Value £30m per boat
- local manufacture of ground to air jammers by plessey Value £100m

4. Jordan

- Completion of Jordanian Defence Package if, under re-scheduling banks make money available. Approximatley £70m outstanding from original package. main items are:

EW equipment
 HF/VHF radios
 Fast Patrol Boats
 Air Combat Simulators
 Mirage F5 Avionics upgrade
 Naval Base facilities

- Completion of KHALID tank gearbox refurbishment programme. Funded and administered by UK MOD. Value £8m.

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7 August 1990

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
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IRAQ/KUWAIT: SALES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT

Ref your MO 6/17/155 dated 6 August 1990.

Brief as requested in your reference.



A W H BARRETT
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CONFIDENTIALOD - 8 AUGUST 1990IRAQ/KUWAIT - SALES AND LOGISTIC SUPPORTBRIEF FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

1. This brief provides information on current sales prospects to Middle East countries and requests from those countries for urgent supplies or logistic support in the light of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

2. As soon as they became aware of the invasion, the DTI took action not to issue any export licences to Iraq or Kuwait. On 3 Aug they revoked all licences for military equipment. A review of dual civil/military was to have taken place, but the UN Embargo has rendered this unnecessary - all licences for both countries are now effectively revoked.

Iran

3. Sales of lethal equipment and any non-lethal equipment which would significantly enhance their capability in a conflict are banned by the existing Ministerial guidelines announced on 29 Oct 1985. In their current negotiations with IMS on pre-Revolution contracts, the Iranians have suggested the supply of new equipment, eg MBTs, as part of a settlement. The difficulty over this has been explained to them, but further requests could arise.

Saudi Arabia

4. At Annex is a background note on Project Al Yamamah, covering also the current Tornado delivery position, the Saudi Government attitude, and at Attachment a copy of the relevant paragraphs of the MOU on HMG obligations in time of tension. Secretary of State will note that the Saudis have not asked the UK to accelerate deliveries, or for additional equipment under the MOU.

5. The Saudi National Guard has, however, asked (through the DA) for supply from British Army stocks of 10,000 respirators and 20,000 NBC suits, plus "gloves etc" (which we understand to mean chemical agent monitors and associated equipment). This presents difficulty for the Army, who may need the stocks themselves - see separate brief of operational matters. Against this background, the DESO is discussing with Industry how they could meet the requirement.

6. BAe have received an enquiry from the Saudi Air Force for NBC kit for 1000 people. This is to include NBC prophylactic medicines, air filtration equipment etc. BAe are continuing to lead on this requirement.

7. The Saudi National Guard have indicated a possible requirement for Field Dressings and Shell Dressings (Minimum 1000

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of each). Commercial suppliers and MOD's Director Medicine have been advised of this possible order and asked to stand ready. The National Guard also called on the UK MOD SANGMED Project Team in Riyadh for advice on setting up 2 field medical units, which are now believed to be operational somewhere in the desert.

8. A UK company Passive Barriers Ltd have been approached by a Saudi company wishing to obtain equipment for physical protection equipment for airfields, border checkpoints and pipelines; also associated equipment and maps of border areas with Iraq and Yemen.

UAE

9. BAe have suggested that they could lease some Tornado aircraft and Rapier missile batteries to UAE. This could involve the need for direct RAF support. D Commitments staff have, however, made clear the difficulty of supplying such support. BAe also wish to include NBC kit in the package. This too will present difficulty because they would be calling on the same NBC suppliers as the DESO is to meet the Saudi request.

Other Middle East Countries

10. We are not aware of any other requests for urgent requirements from other ME countries.

Current Sales Prospects to Middle East Countries

11. Separate brief to follow.

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ANNEXPROJECT AL YAMAMAH (SAUDI ARMED FORCES PROJECT)BACKGROUND

Project Al Yamamah is the name given by the Saudis to the initial supply contract signed in 1985 with the UK for provision of Tornado (IDS and ADV), Hawk and PC-9 trainer aircraft plus associated weapons equipment and support. The scope of the Project has since been greatly enhanced by the signature in 1988 of a further Formal Understanding confirming Saudi interest in additional Tornados, Hawk 200s, Sandown Class MCMVs, Black Hawk Helicopters, construction of new Air Bases, and associated support and equipment including weapons and defence systems. If implemented, these new requirements would extend the Project well into the 21st Century and would increase the value of the Project from the initial figure of £5 billion to at least £15-20 billion.

ORGANISATION

The UKMOD Saudi Armed Forces Project Office (SAP) manages the Project on behalf of the Saudi Government. The main office, Castlewood House in London, comprises some 120 Service and Civilian staff; there is also a UKMOD Team permanently based in Saudi Arabia comprising some 70 Service and Civilian staff based at Riyadh, Dhahran and Khamis Mushayt.

The obligations of these individuals and of HMG in periods of tension are set out in the Government-to-Government MOU controlling the Project. The relevant paragraphs of the MOU are at Attachment A.

SAUDI GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES

Thus far, the Saudi Government has not asked for any special or additional support or help from HMG. Apart therefore from notifying ACAS of the current alert status of the RSAF and asking for all due support from the three Commands if requested by the Saudi Government, we have taken no specific action within UKMOD. The Saudis have certainly not asked us to accelerate deliveries nor have they asked for additional equipment beyond that already being supplied; we are not surprised since this seems entirely in-line with their (Saudi) approach of avoiding any provocative action that could be misinterpreted by their neighbours.

DELIVERY POSITION

Of the original 48 Tornado IDS ordered, 26 have been delivered so far and total delivery should be complete by August 1991. Of the original 24 Tornado ADV, 20 have been delivered with the remaining 4 due to be delivered as quickly as possible. All

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30 Hawk, all 30 PC-9, the 2 Jetstreams and the 4 BAe 125 originally ordered have been delivered.

On weapons, deliveries are substantially complete on everything ordered except a selection of ammunition.

Deliveries due in the immediate future are 1 Tornado IDS and 3 Tornado ADV likely to be delivered towards the end of this month; there is also 1 Sandown Class Ship nearing completion (with Saudi RSNF crew under training in the UK) and Ship 02 under construction but delivery and acceptance of these is still some way away.

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ATTACHMENT A

EXTRACT FROM AL YAMAMAH MOU

"36. It is understood between the Governments that, subject to consultation, United Kingdom civilian or military personnel will remain available in Saudi Arabia for preparation, including arming and support, of aircraft during an armed conflict, but that under no circumstances will they be permitted or requested or required otherwise to participate in such a conflict undertaken by the armed forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

37. In the case of the outbreak of war, or any other event that might endanger the safety of foreign employees, the Saudi Arabian Government will be responsible for any costs incurred by the United Kingdom Government in retaining or replacing the appropriate employees in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, subject to the agreement of the Saudi Arabian Government to those arrangements. The United Kingdom Government can, after consultation with the Saudi Arabian Government, withdraw or replace personnel whose safety is endangered or suspend the arrangements provided for in the MOU.

38. The Saudi Arabian Government will be responsible for and will reimburse the United Kingdom Government for loss of, or damage to property owned by BAe, its subsidiary companies, sub-contractors, their personnel and dependants or the Team, its dependants, its servants and representatives located in Saudi Arabia, where such loss or damage is sustained due to or arising out of acts of war, conflict or any other act of violence or interference affect that property whatsoever."

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SUBJECT CC MASTER

CAROLINE

File
NB Mary Nichols, David -
a good note
MS

The Attorney General telephoned the Prime Minister this evening to discuss Rules of Engagement (I monitored the call as you had just left No. 10 and the Attorney General was in no mood to be stalled)!

He started by saying that he was totally content with the revised Rules of Engagement and the Prime Minister commented that she had seen his department's letter and the Foreign Office comments which she had received by fax this afternoon in Cornwall.

They then went on to discuss the situation in the Middle East in general terms. The Prime Minister was keen to know if it was possible to use international law as another weapon against Saddam Hussain. The Attorney General responded by saying Hussain was clearly not the sort of man to pay heed to any form of law, international or otherwise, and that if anything we should consider international law to be more of a shield than a sword. The Prime Minister felt that it was important that we reminded all concerned of Iraq's initial act of aggression against Kuwait and did not lose sight of this amongst all the allegations of aggression and military build-up by the US and her allies.

They also discussed the magnitude of the American military presence and whether this might be construed as being an offensive force rather than a defensive one. The Prime Minister considered that from what we know of the threat posed by Iraqi forces the proposed levels of American military hardware were totally consistent with an effective defensive force. Another reason for maintaining a strong military presence is to reassure friendly Arab States, especially Saudi Arabia, of our capability to withstand attack and also in the sense that the American forces may well be dispersed anyway to counter threats in other locations.

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- 2 -

The conversation concluded with the Prime Minister telling the Attorney General about tomorrow's meeting and inviting him to attend. He replied that it would be very worthwhile and looked forward to seeing her tomorrow.

Stacey .

DAVID STACEY

(Duty Clerk)

19 August 1990

c:\david (slh)

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COVERING PERIOD 181800Z AUG TO 191800Z AUG

1. GENERAL SITUATION. IRAQ HAS OCNFIRMED THAT BRITONS IN IRAQ WHO FAIL TO REPORT TO HOTELS NOMINATED BY THE IRAQIS WILL BE ROUNDED UP AND TAKEN TO KEY SITES IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN PROBABLY SEES THIS AS A WAY OF PARALYSING WESTERN DECISION MAKING CAPACITY. IRAQ IS REDEPLOYING ITS FORCES WITHIN KUWAIT AND IS REINFORCING THEM WITH NEW UNITS

2. ENEMY SITUATION. IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT REMAIN IN A RELATIVELY UNCHANGED POSTURE. FORCES IN THE SOUTH ARE DEPLOYED BEHIND A DEFENSIVE LINE WHICH RUNS PARALLEL TO AND SOME 10 TO 20KM INSET FROM THE SAUDI BORDER. THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS REDEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI TROOPS WITHIN KUWAIT AND IT IS LIKELY THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE. IRAQI MAINTAINS FIGHTER OPS OVER KUWAIT AND SOUTHERN IRAQ. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS CONTINUE TO OPERATE FROM AIRFIELDS IN KUWAIT. IRAQI STRENGTH IN KUWAIT IS ESTIMATED AT 1100-1200 TANKS, 1100-1200 APC AND 800 ARTILLERY PIECES. TROOP NUMBERS ARE ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 104000. INT ASSESSMENT: THE PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENT STILL FACILITATES A RAPID SHIFT TO AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE, BUT A LACK OF CRITICAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY MAKES ANY IMMEDIATE OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA UNLIKELY

3. OWN SITUATION

A. NAVAL SITUATION. AS REPORTED BY CINCFLEET

B. AIR/MARITIME AIR SITUATION. 1. THE 12 TORNADO F3 AT DHAHRAN HAVE CARRIED OUT ROUTINE TRAINING: UP TO 18 AUG, 56 IN-THEATRE SORTIES HAD BEEN FLOWN. F4S AT AKROTIRI HAVE CONTINUED TO HOLD 2 AT RS10 DURING DAYLIGHT AND RS60 OVERNIGHT. AT THUMRAIT, THE JAGUAR DETACHEMNT FLEW 14 TRAINING SORTIES TODAY (INCLUDING TWO AIRCRAFT

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WHICH FLEW RETURN TRANSITS TO BAHRAIN). THE NIMROD MR2 AT SEEB FLEW 2 SURFACE SURVEILLANCE SORTIES (A TOTAL OF 9 OP SORTIES HAVE BEEN FLOWN TO DATE) WE ARE STILL EXPERIENCING COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN SEEB AND CTG 321.1 AND BY SIGNAL BETWEEN SEEB AND UK. 2. NIL 3. NIL

C. LAND SITUATION. 1. NIL. 2. NIL. 3. NIL

4. ASSESSMENT. NO CHANGE FROM ASSESSREP 008/AUG

5. INTENTIONS

A. TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING SORTIES FROM ALL 3 ESTABLISHED BASES

B. TO COMPLETE THE LOGISTIC BUILD UP

C. TO RESOLVE ROE PROBLEMS TO PERMIT FULL TORNADO F3 PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED AD OPERATIONS

D. TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HQ AT RIYADH

E. TO ENHANCE LIAISON WITH ALLIED FORCES AS NECESSARY

6. MISSION PRIORITIES. NO CHANGE TO ASSESSREP 001/AUG

BT

YYYY

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MR FAIRWEATHER

MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)

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Phai Minister?
Latest report for
Crispe Tiddell
as promised.

*MS**19/8*

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: NEXT STEPS

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE AMERICAN PRE-WORKING PAPER
CIRCULATED AT THE MEETING OF THE FIVE ON 19 AUGUST:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTION 660, 661, 662,

HAVING CALLED UPON IRAQ TO END ITS OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT BY
WITHDRAWING IMMEDIATELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY ALL OF ITS FORCES TO THE
LINES OCCUPIED ON AUGUST 1, 1990:

HAVING DECIDED IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE BREACH OF THE PEACE TO IMPOSE
SANCTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHAPTER ROMAN VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS:

DEEPLY CONCERNED IN PARTICULAR BY THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF IRAQI
FORCES IN THE TERRITORY OF KUWAIT AND THE THREAT POSED TO
NEIGHBORING STATES:

GRAVELY ALARMED THAT IRAQ CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COMPLY WITH
RESOLUTIONS 660, 661 AND 662 AND IN PARTICULAR THE CONDUCT OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN USING IRAQI FLAG VESSELS TO EXPORT OIL:

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER ROMAN VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

(RECOMMENDS/AFFIRS), IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE RESOLUTIONS,
THAT MEMBER STATES SHOULD TAKE ALL NECESSARY ACTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE CHARTER, INCLUDING USE, IN COOPERATION WITH THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT AND OTHERS, OF SUCH AIR, SEA OR LAND FORCES, AS
MAY BE NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THESE RESOLUTIONS.

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 MR TOMKYS
 MR ~~GORE BOOTH~~
 MR FAIRWEATHER
 MR GOULDEN
 HD/MED
 HD/NENAD
 HD/NAD
~~HD/EEB~~
 HD/SOVIET D
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 HD/UND
 HD/ACDD
 HD/CONSULAR D
 HD/NEWS D
 HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
 HD/AMD
 HD/ECD(E)
 MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
 MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
 MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
 MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
 (BY TUBE H29)
 PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
 SIR P CRADOCK,
 (NO 10 DOWNING ST)
 CABINET OFFICE DIO
 (BY TUBE H29)
 SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
 AUS (C) MODUK
 HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
 MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND(2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
 RESIDENT CLERK

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 INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKDEL OEC, OTHER OPEC POSTS, ANKARA
 INFO ROUTINE AMMAN, UKMIS VIENNA

MY TELNO 683: SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION

SUMMARY

1. FURTHER PUBLIC CONFIRMATION OF SAUDI WISH TO HOLD IMMEDIATE OPEC MEETING. FIRST PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SAUDI INTENTION TO INCREASE PRODUCTION.

DETAIL

2. SAUDI NEWSPAPERS TODAY CARRY A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH PETROLEUM MINISTER HISHAM NAZER GAVE IN JEDDA ON 18 AUGUST. NAZER CONFIRMED THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS PRESSING FOR AN IMMEDIATE OPEC MEETING TO BOOST INTERNATIONAL OIL PRODUCTION TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SHORTFALL IN SUPPLIES. NAZER CONSIDERED THIS ACTION ESSENTIAL TO STAVE OFF RECESSION AND INFLATION IN OIL-IMPORTING COUNTRIES. HE (CLEVERLY) DREW ATTENTION IN PARTICULAR TO THE PLIGHT OF POOR THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND ASSURED THEM THAT SAUDI ARABIA WOULD NOT LET THEM 'GO DOWN THE DRAIN'.

3. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN PUBLIC, NAZER ALSO DECLARED THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS READY TO ACT UNILATERALLY IF NO CONSENSUS COULD BE FOUND WITHIN OPEC. HE SAID THE KINGDOM COULD BOOST ITS PRODUCTION BY 2 MILLION BPD IN A 'VERY SHORT PERIOD', AND THOUGHT THAT VENEZUELA AND UAE COULD ADD A FURTHER 500,000 BPD EACH. NAZER CONCEDED THAT SOME OPEC MEMBERS (HE SINGLED OUT INDONESIA) THOUGHT STOCKS SHOULD BE DRAWN DOWN BEFORE ANY INCREASE IN PRODUCTION TOOK PLACE. BUT HE MAINTAINED THAT AN EMERGENCY OPEC MEETING WAS REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY TO FACE UP TO THE CRISIS. OTHERWISE, IN 'TWO WEEKS OR SO' THE WORLD FACED AN OIL MARKET DESTABILISED NOT BY MARKET FORCES, BUT BY IRAQI AGGRESSION. NAZER ADDED THAT FAILURE BY OPEC TO MEET WOULD LEAVE SAUDI ARABIA WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO IT ALONE.

COMMENT

4. A PETROLEUM MINISTRY SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT THE SAUDIS WILL NOW WAIT TO SEE OPEC MEMBERS' REACTIONS TO NAZER'S COMMENTS. IF, AS THE SOURCE SUSPECTED THERE IS STILL INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR AN OPEC MEETING, THE SAUDIS WILL ABANDON THEIR EFFORTS IN THIS DIRECTION AND RAISE PRODUCTION UNILATERALLY UNDER SOME OTHER AD HOC COVER.

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TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
TELNO U/N
OF 190717Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 5705
AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 1125
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF HONINGTON
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF WITTERING
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF MARHAM
AND TO IMMEDIATE FORY
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ATTENTION INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS PD
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OPERATION GRANBY INTELLIGENCE SITREP AS AT 190600Z AUG 90

MILITARY SITUATION IN KUWAIT

1. IRAQI GROUND FORCES POSTURE IN KUWAIT REMAINS RELATIVELY UNCHANGED. THE BUILD UP OF MOST FORCES IN THE SOUTH IS BEHIND A DEFENSIVE LINE RUNNING PARALLELED TO, AND SOME 20 TO 30 KMS NORTH OF, THE KUWAITI BORDER. NO FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS OF IRAQI TROOPS INTO KUWAIT HAVE BEEN OBSERVED. HOWEVER THERE HAS BEEN CONTINUOUS REDEPLOYMENT OF IRAQI DIVISIONS WITHIN KUWAIT. ELEMENTS OF THE 6TH ARMoured DIVISION ARE STILL IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA NORTH OF AL JAHRA AND IT CANNOT BE CONFIRMED WHETHER THE 6TH ARMoured DIVISION HAS TAKEN OVER SOME OF THE FRONT LINE RESPONSIBILITIES OF OTHER DIVISIONS. IT IS LIKELY THAT REDEPLOYMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE PLACE. A SECOND DEFENSIVE POSITION HELD BY AN INFANTRY BRIGADE HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED ON THE COASTAL HIGHWAY CLOSE TO THE SAUDI BORDER.
2. TOTAL IRAQI STRENGTH IN KUWAIT IS ESTIMATED TO BE 1100-1200 TANKS, 1100-1200 ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND 800 ARTILLERY PIECES, TROOP STRENGTH IS ESTIMATED AS 104,000.
3. CONSOLIDATION OF AIR DEFENCE HAS CONTINUED. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE IRAQI FORCES ARE ATTEMPTING TO BRING KUWAITI AIR DEFENCE ASSETS INTO OPERATION INCLUDING SA8 GECKO.
4. THERE ARE RUMOURS OF A SUICIDE CAR BOMB ATTACK BY ONE OR MORE KUWAITIS ON A HOSPITAL AT AL JABARIYAH, IN KUWAIT CITY, BEING USED

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BY IRAQI TROOPS.

MILITARY SITUATION IN IRAQ

5. THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT IRAQI FIXED WING AIRCRAFT ARE BEING BASED IN KUWAIT. HOWEVER FOUR HIP AND EIGHT LIGHT HELICOPTERS REMAIN AT AL SALEM AIRFIELD. TWO HIND HELICOPTERS REMAIN AT AHMED AL JABER AIRFIELD IN KUWAIT.

6. IN NORTHERN IRAQ THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE IRAQI 5TH CORPS REMAINS FACING TURKEY IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

7. IT IS REPORTED THAT AL TAJI SRBM FACILITY HAS OUTLOADED AT LEAST 30 PROBABLE AL ABBAS AIRFRAMES SINCE THE START OF THE CONFLICT. THE AL ABBAS IS A DERIVATIVE OF THE SCUD WITH A CLAIMED EXTENDED RANGE OF 900 KMS.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

8. THE USS REID FIRED WARNING SHOTS ACROSS THE BOWS OF THE TWO SMALL IRAQI TANKERS BABA GURGUR AND KHANAQUIN IN THE APPROACHES TO THE ARABIAN GULF. THE ARMS CARRIER BALQUEES REMAINS IN PORT AT TARABALUS, LIBYA. THE OIL TANKERS AL FAO AND AL QADISIYAH HAVE LEFT THE AREA OF MUAJJIZ OIL TERMINAL ON SAUDI ARABIA'S RED SEA COAST HAVING BEEN REFUSED AUTHORITY TO UPLOAD CRUDE.

9. THE IRANIAN NAVY CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST ONE VESSEL ON PATROL IN THE NORTHERN GULF AND ONE IN THE SOUTHERN GULF MONITORING THE BUILD UP OF FOREIGN WARSHIPS IN THE AREA AND MERCHANT SHIPS TRANSITING THE GULF.

10. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES PARTY OF IRAQ, SAMI ABDUL RAHMAN, HAS SOUGHT FINANCIAL HELP FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO BEGIN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN KURDISTAN ALONG THE TURKISH/IRAN BORDER. DURING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR THE KURDS SUCCESSFULLY TIED DOWN THE EQUIVALENT OF 6 IRAQI DIVISIONS FOR LONG PERIODS.

11. IRAQ MOVED A SECOND BATCH OF 1000 IRANIAN POWS TO THE BORDER TOWN OF KHANAQUN (3421N 4523E) ON 18 AUGUST. ON 18 AUGUST IRAN RETURNED ITS FIRST BATCH OF 1000 IRAQI POW AT KHORSRANI (UNIDENTIFIED).

12. THE IRANIAN NEWS AGENCY (IRNA) REPORTED ON 18 AUGUST THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI TROOPS FROM WESTERN BORDER AREAS OF IRAN, WHICH BEGAN ON 17 AUGUST, CONTINUES. IRAQI FORCES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM POSITIONS ALL ALONG THE BORDER FROM SAYYID SADIQ 3522N 4554E TO AREA SOUTH OF ABADAN 3020N 4817E.

13. AIR DEFENCE HAS BEEN OBSERVED TO BE ACTIVE IN THE AREA OF BANDAR ABBAS ON THE IRANIAN COAST ON THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ. FIVE 1-HAWK LAUNCHERS HAVE BEEN OBSERVED, AN INCREASE FROM

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THE USUAL TWO.

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AND TO IMMEDIATE FORY
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FINAL SECTION OF TWO.
ASSESSMENT

14. IT IS NOT THOUGHT LIKELY THAT FORMATIONS BEING USED IN THE DEFENSIVE LINE WOULD BE USED IN THE FIRST ECHELON OF AN OFFENSIVE. IRAQI REDEPLOYMENTS IN KUWAIT HAVE STILL NOT ACHIEVED THE RELEASE OF SUFFICIENT FORCES TO CREATE AN ADEQUATE STRIKE FORCE FOR A GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA. THUS WE ASSESS THAT IRAQI FORCES IN KUWAIT ARE STILL DEFENSIVELY DEPLOYED THOUGH WITH AN INCREASED CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT A SHORT WARNING LIMITED STRIKE. AN OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAUDI ARABIA IS NOT LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE
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TELNO 442

OF 191400Z AUGUST 90

INFO FLASH MODUK ACTOR

INFO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD WASHINGTON PARIS BONN UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA

YOUR TELNO 276 (NOT TO ALL): FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT.

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF 81 BRITISH CITIZENS TAKEN FROM THE
REGENCY PALACE HOTEL:

PAUL WESTWOOD	HILARY WESTWOOD	TRUDI TAYLOR
WENDY MAJOR	DONALD MAJOR	DAVID CROSS
CAROLINE JOHNSON	BARBARA GRIFFITH	SANDRA GUEST
CHRISTOPHER MALONEY	KENNETH BEST	JOSEPHINE BEST
LINDA DOWIN	ERIC WATSON	JOHN CHAPPELL
JENNIFER CHAPPELL	JOHN P M CHAPPELL	MAUREEN CHAPPELL
ERICA MASTERS	DAVID FORT	EDWARD HAMMETT
PAUL DIEPPE	DAVID BANKS	EDWARD MAY
DAVID MYERS	BIGNIEW KUNICK	ALAN MATHESON
PENNY MATHESON	MALCOLM LOOK	JACKY MILLER
KEITH BARKER	GEORGE PARIS	BOB WHITLING
NEAL DYER	PETER SALTER	DENISE DYER
CHARLIE KRISTIANSON	NICKY WAYE	MIKE COOPER
JOAN PEPPER	VIVienne BROOK	ROY GRANT
ANNA OLIVER	JACQUELINE LOMAX	JANET MCLEAN
CAROLE BEVIS	CLIVE EARTHY	GLEN BURTON
MALCOLM BUTCHER	PETER EVERSLED	MAXIME WOODS
JANE BATESON	MARIA BELL	HELEN CURTIN
JACQUELINE HUNTER	NICOLA LOVE	CLAIRE PALMER
SANDRA DAVIES	DEREK STODDARD	SALLY MAYES (HAYES)
ALEXIS PATTIE	JULIE EXTON	JOYCE OKWUOSAH
TRACEY HATTERSLEY	KEN MORAN	JENNY GRIFFITHS
PHIL LONG	LES BAXTER	PAT MORRIS
MARIE HALL	KERRY AGNEW	JULIE DYER
BRYONY GREWDON	ANDREW PLUMRIDGE	GEORGE BISWAS
SANDRA ALLEN		

2. THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PROBABLY TAKEN BUT MAY CONCEIVABLY

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HAVE MADE A RUN FOR IT OR GONE INTO HIDING:

PAUL EDMONDS
TIM JENNINGSALEEM FFAHEEM
GREIG POLLOCKSHAUN HODGE
GERALD THOMAS

3. WE HAVE LOCATED 48 OF THE 81: ABOUT 35 ARE IN A VILLA
BEHIND THE PYRAMID MOSQUE (NEAR MARZUQ PEARL IN SALMIYA)
AND 12 (PLUS ONE FRENCHMAN) ARE IN A VILLA NEXT TO THE
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CAMPUS (WE BELIEVE IN SHUWAIKH).

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HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND(2)
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OF 190830Z AUGUST 90

INFO FLASH MODUK BAGHDAD ACTOR

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YOUR TELNO 518 TO BAGHDAD: FOREIGN NATIONALS IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ.

SUMMARY

1. PROTEST DELIVERED TO AL-DOURI. NO INFORMATION FORTHCOMING.
ROUNDING UP TO CONTINUE. IRAQI EMBASSY TO CLOSE ON 24 AUGUST:
 STRONG ADVICE TO LEAVE BEFORE THEN. SUBSEQUENT ATTEMPT TO MAKE
FOUR-POWER DEMARCHE THWARTED.

DETAIL

2. I CALLED ON AL-DOURI AT 190630Z AND DELIVERED A STRONG PROTEST
 AT THE DETENTION OF BRITISH CITIZENS AND THEIR TRANSFER TO VARIOUS
 DESTINATIONS AGAINST THEIR WILL. I ASKED TO BE GIVEN
 A FULL LIST OF ALL BRITISH CITIZENS INVOLVED, TO BE TOLD WHERE THEY
ALL WERE AND TO BE GRANTED THE RIGHT OF CONSULAR ACCESS. AL-DOURI
 SAID HE WOULD TAKE NOTE OF MY PROTEST, THOUGH IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
 MADE IN BAGHDAD (I SAID WE WOULD BE PROTESTING THERE TOO, AND NO
DOUBT ALSO IN LONDON). HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHERE EVERYONE
 WAS, BUT I COULD BE ASSURED THEY WERE BEING WELL LOOKED AFTER.
 HE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO GIVE ME A FULL LIST IN DUE COURSE, BUT
 IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO VISIT THEM QUOTE FOR THE
 MOMENT UNQUOTE.

3. AL-DOURI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WAS SHORTLY TO BE AN
 ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE RADIO (MY TELNO 435), INSTRUCTING QUOTE
ALL WESTERNERS PLUS THE AUSTRALIANS UNQUOTE TO REPORT TO VARIOUS
 HOTELS. WHEN I COMMENTED THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF THOSE WHO HAD
REPORTED SO FAR WOULD NOT EXACTLY ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO OBEY,
 AL-DOURI SAID HE HAD WARNED ME YESTERDAY WHAT WAS INTENDED: THOSE
 WHO WENT TO THE HOTELS TODAY WOULD ALSO BE TRANSFERRED TO
 QUOTE KEY INSTALLATIONS UNQUOTE IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ. THOSE WHO DID
 NOT REPORT TO THE HOTELS WOULD BE ROUNDED UP AND TAKEN DIRECT TO THE
 SITES. I MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THOSE DETAINED WERE KEY WORKERS

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IN THE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANT, AND AL-DOURI SAID THE AUTHORITIES WERE CHECKING WHAT THOSE THEY ROUNDED UP DID, AND WOULD SEND BACK THOSE WITH USEFUL JOBS, WHO WERE PREPARED TO WORK.

4. AL -DOURI SAID THE IRAQI EMBASSY WOULD BE CLOSING ON 24 AUGUST. WHEN WOULD I BE LEAVING KUWAIT? I SAID I WOULD BE STAYING HERE, AS WOULD ALL MY EC COLLEAGUES AND, I THOUGHT, MOST OTHER AMBASSADORS. HAVING CONFIRMED THAT THIS WAS OUR OFFICIAL POSITION AL-DOURI SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE TO STAY: HE WOULD DO HIS BEST FOR US, BUT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES WOULD CUT OFF OUR WATER AND ELECTRICITY (IT WOULD, HE ADDED, BE ILLEGAL TO USE A GENERATOR) AND WOULD HAVE NO HESITATION ABOUT ROUNDING UP ALL THOSE WHO STAYED AND TAKING THEM TO BAGHDAD QUOTE BY FORCE UNQUOTE. I COMMENTED THAT WE WOULD CROSS THAT BRIDGE WHEN WE CAME TO IT: ALOT COULD HAPPEN IN FIVE DAYS. MEANWHILE, MY GOVERNMENTS' POSITION WAS FIRM.

5. I SAID THERE DID NOT SEEM MUCH MORE TO BE SAID. I WOULD, HOWEVER, BE RETURNING LATER, TOGETHER WITH MY US, GERMAN AND FRENCH CLGBAGUES.

6. WHEN THE FOUR OF US ATTEMPTED TO SEE AL-DOURI TOGETHER, HOWEVER, AT 190730Z, WE WERE TOLD THE EMBASSY WAS CLOSED AND WE SHOULD COME BACK ON 20 AUGUST.

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DIFFUSION RESTREINTE

REF: SITUATION IN KUWAIT.

THE DANISH EMBASSY IN KUWAIT INFORMS THE MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRES THAT THIS MORNING 101 GUESTS WERE
TAKEN FROM REGENCY PALACE, MOSTLY BRITISH, INCLUDING
13 WHO WERE CAUGHT AT SAUDI BORDER. ALSO THIS MORNING
24 GUESTS WERE TAKEN FROM KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL HOTEL.
(15 UK, 5 US, 3 GERMAN AND 1 FRENCH).
END OF TEXT

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OF 190515Z AUGUST 90

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INFO IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST, HAVANA, BAGHDAD, UKDEL NATO, ACTOR, LIMA

MIPT: IRAQ/KUWAIT: FOREIGN COMMUNITIES

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SCR 664:

BEGINS

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING THE IRAQI INVASION AND PURPORTED ANNEXATION OF
KUWAIT AND RESOLUTIONS 660, 661 AND 662,

DEEPLY CONCERNED FOR THE SAFETY AND WELL BEING OF THIRD STATE
NATIONALS IN IRAQ AND KUWAIT,

RECALLING THE OBLIGATIONS OF IRAQ IN THIS REGARD UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW,

WELCOMING THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PURSUE URGENT
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ FOLLOWING THE CONCERN AND
ANXIETY EXPRESSED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL ON 17 AUGUST 1990,

ACTING UNDER CHAPTER ROMAN VII OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:

1. DEMANDS THAT IRAQ PERMIT AND FACILITATE THE IMMEDIATE
DEPARTURE FROM KUWAIT AND IRAQ OF THE NATIONALS OF THIRD COUNTRIES
AND GRANT IMMEDIATE AND CONTINUING ACCESS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO
SUCH NATIONALS:

2. FURTHER DEMANDS THAT IRAQ TAKE NO ACTION TO JEOPARDIZE THE
SAFETY, SECURITY OR HEALTH OF SUCH NATIONALS:

3. REAFFIRMS ITS DECISION IN RESOLUTION 662 (1990) THAT
ANNEXATION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ IS NULL AND VOID, AND THEREFORE DEMANDS
THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ RESCIND ITS ORDERS FOR THE CLOSURE OF

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DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN KUWAIT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE IMMUNITY OF THEIR PERSONNEL, AND REFRAIN FROM ANY SUCH ACTIONS IN THE FUTURE:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

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PRIME MINISTER

IRAQ: PROGRESS REPORT

The main developments since we last spoke have been:

Iraqi Peace Offer

President Saddam set out at 16.00 hours our time new conditions for ending the Gulf crisis and for releasing trapped foreign nationals. He said that US and other western forces should leave the region under UN supervision and economic sanctions should stop. He said that the question of Kuwait should be dealt with like other inter - Arab disputes, including the Western Sahara and Syrian occupation of part of the Lebanon. There was no mention of Israel.

The US response has been low key. CEEFAX reports that "US officials said the terms did not appear to meet the conditions for a withdrawal from Saudi Arabia." The UK are not planning a formal response.

UN

Your comments on the draft Resolution were fed to Crispen Tickell. The Political councillors will be meeting this evening to put together a composite draft Resolution which is likely to include some of our points. A draft is then likely to be considered tomorrow morning New York time though it is not yet sure in which forum. The FCO are reasonably hopeful that a Resolution will be agreed but they are not sure on what timescale.

Captive Foreign Nationals

Not a great deal more here. I am told that the Britons who sought refuge in our Baghdad Embassy are still there.

There are reports that Iraq is to let some Europeans leave as "a gesture of goodwill." The Iraqi news agency said some Swiss,

Austrians, Swedish, Finns and Portuguese will be allowed to leave. The reasons for this are variously reported. CEEFAX says that the Iran Speaker had said this was because their countries were not imposing sanctions on the import of food, medicine and other goods to Iraq. Skynews said it was because they had not contributed forces. This account is further contradicted by an earlier account that the Iraqi Ambassador in Switzerland had told the Swiss Government that their nationals would be held because they were supporting a Security Council Resolution.

Clashes and Military Assessment

No reports of clashes. Latest reports that we have on the military situation suggest that Iraqi forces on the Kuwait/Saudi Arabia border are still defensively deployed though with an increased capacity to carry out a short warning limited strike - but an offensive against Saudi Arabia in the near future seems unlikely.

Recall of Parliament

Tam Dalyell phoned today to ask you to recall Parliament. He said the families of the Britons in Iraq and Kuwait would expect it. But he added that his request was not endorsed formally by Gerald Kaufman.

OPEC

The Saudis have called for an immediate OPEC meeting to boost international production, saying it would act unilaterally if no consensus could be found in OPEC or if OPEC did not meet.

I attach a selection of today's telegrams. We are awaiting a

telegram from Sir Crispen Tickell about today's UN activities
which I will send up to you when it arrives.

URS

Caroline Slocock

19 August 1990

1990-08-19 10:54

P.01

(37)

Seen

PRIME MINISTER

GULF EDITORIALS

The rapidly-changing situation in the Gulf means that the news pages this morning are somewhat out of date. The editorials, however, generally give back up to a firm military response from the west to the Iraqi actions.

The Sunday Times, Sunday Telegraph and News of the World call for an early strike against Saddam. The Sunday Times says that "it is to Bush's credit that he has organised an international resistance to Saddam; if it results in war, there should be no doubt that, like the war against Hitler, it would be a just war, to be pursued until Saddam has been toppled. And if war with Sadd. is inevitable, better it comes now rather than later".

The Sunday Telegraph says "that Bush should attack Iraq now." Peregrine Worsthorne says "without the Iraq challenge the extent of European isolationism would have remained obscure. It is now out in the open for all to see".

Support for military action also from the Sunday Express and the Sunday Mirror. The Express says "daily the net closes tighter around Saddam and his brutal regime. He is hemmed in. For him the issue now is one of survival. For neither George Bush nor Margaret Thatcher is going to suffer a loss of nerve. The Mirror says "we have to make it clear that whatever the cost, whatever the threat there will be no retreat from the defence of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and no stepping back from freeing Kuwait from illegal occupation. There should be no slackening in the build up of forces to deter his conquest of the Middle East.

The Correspondent emphasises the need for a mandate from the Security Council to enforce the embargo. If the Security Council will not move beyond the measures it has taken so far, then legitimate national interests will force Britain and the US to move without a UN crutch. It would then become imperative to appeal to our European allies. If they wish to maintain the flow

- 2 -

of oil, protect their nationals and preserve the stability of this crucial region, they cannot sit on their backsides and rely on others to do the dirty work. If the vaunted unity of Europe is to mean anything, it must hope that pulls together come the crunch.

The People says that Saddam's treacherous tactics should not be treated as the trigger for the all-out war which some see as inevitable. If the civilised world stands firm against a defiant dictator, there is still a hope of ending the Middle East's agony by a peaceful means.

The Observer and the Mail on Sunday demand immediate recall of Parliament. The Observer says that "this affair cannot be run with the Prime Minister and virtually the whole Cabinet on holiday, and public responses left to the trembling lip of a junior Foreign Office Minister. Mrs. Thatcher's place is in Downing Street, to which she should return this weekend. The House of Commons should then be recalled as soon as possible". The Mail on Sunday says that the Government has brutally sidelined Parliament by failing to recall.

The Independent on Sunday says that "a statesmanlike and gradualist policy acted out in the UN is unlikely to withstand domestic political pressure in Britain and the US. The awful fact is that by taking thousands of civilian hostages, Iraq has made military intervention by the US and Britain more rather than less likely. If the fighters and the marines go in the casualties will probably include some western hostages. It is a dreadful prospect, but it is no reason for changing western policy."

Philip Aylett

PP PHILIP AYLETT
19 August 1990
c:\philip (slh)

1990-08-19 10:54

(57)

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PHILIP AYLETT

19 August 1990

c:\philip (slh)

PS NO 10 DOWNING ST. ①

CONFIDENTIAL

DEDIP

FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 191300Z FCO

TELNO 434

OF 191030Z AUGUST 98

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE**
SERIAL No. T195190

MIPT: MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE:

SUBJECT CC OFS
MASTER

BEGIN

I HAVE READ YOUR TWO MESSAGES WITH GREAT CARE AND ATTENTION TO THE SUBSTANCE THEY CONTAINED. HOWEVER, I HAVE TO TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOUR, AS WE COMMUNICATE AS FRIENDS AT THIS TIME OF CRISIS, THAT THEIR TONE WAS UNWORTHY OF YOU MY FRIEND.

I REGRET THAT MY TIME DID NOT PERMIT ME TO AVAIL MYSELF OF YOUR INVITATION TO STOP IN LONDON TO MEET YOU ON MY WAY BACK FROM MY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. I HOPE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

OF COURSE, OUR RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES WILL, IN THE MEANTIME, CONTINUE THEIR DIALOGUE OVER ALL MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

I AM,
YOUR SINCERE FRIEND,
HUSSEIN

ENDS

2. PLEASE ADVANCE TO FS/HO. 10.

REEVE

1990-08-19 13:26

P.02

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEDIP

FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 191300Z FCO

TELNO 434

OF 191300Z AUGUST 20

me
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REEVE

PS NO 10
DOWNING ST

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEDIR

FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 191300Z FCO

TELNO 433

OF 191030Z AUGUST 90

*Refer to me
of air when
Charles
no*

MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FROM KING HUSSEIN

1. MBFT CONTAINS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE FROM KING HUSSEIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER DATED 18 AUGUST WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED TO ME BY THE HEAD OF THE ROYAL COURT TODAY (19 AUGUST). ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. I DO NOT THINK THAT THE KING WOULD HAVE INCLUDED IN THIS MESSAGE THE HOPE THAT HE AND MRS THATCHER WOULD MEET AGAIN SOON IF HE HAD NOT MEANT IT. AND THE FINAL PARAGRAPH COULD IMPLY SOME UNCLINATION TO DISTANCE HIMSELF PERSONALLY - A HINT THAT BUSINESS MIGHT BE CONDUCTED ONLY AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL FOR THE TIME BEING - UNTIL THIS MEETING HAS TAKEN PLACE.

3. IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT OUR LINES TO THE KING SHOULD REMAIN OPEN AS THE CRISIS DEVELOPS. HE IS TAKING ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS HIMSELF AND THERE IS NO-ONE ELSE WHO CAN BE COUNTED UPON TO PROVIDE RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS.

4. I SUGGEST THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT RESPOND TO HIS SECOND PARAGRAPH BY INVITING HIM TO BRITAIN AS SOON AS HE IS ABLE TO COME. AND THAT SHE SHOULD PROPOSE THAT THE DISCUSSION SHOULD COVER ALL ASPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT CRISIS. MRS THATCHER MIGHT ALSO WISH TO MENTION THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO VISIT AMMAN ON 4/5 SEPTEMBER WITH THE AIM OF MAINTAINING THE DIALOGUE WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL AT THIS CRITICAL TIME.

5. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 10.

REEVE

TOTAL P.03

1990-08-19 13:26

P.03

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEDIP

FM AMMAN

TO DESKBY 191300Z FCO

TELNO 433

OF 191030Z AUGUST 90

*Refer to me
 again when
 Charles
 returns
 me*

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5. PLEASE ADVANCE TO PS/NO. 10.

REEVE

TOTAL P.03

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24A(a-b) 077430
MDADAN 0106

SECRET
FM MODUK
TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
TELNO U/N
OF 182359Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH

PRIME MINISTER

Still no sign of an
imminent offensive

DSS 19/8.

ADVANCE COPY

Report on BL Team as noted!

SIC 19M

CRDA 0903

OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP EIGHT

18 AUG 1990

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION GRANBY WILL BE ISSUED DAILY AT 2359Z. ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS THEY REQUIRE.
2. INTELLIGENCE. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS OF IRAQI TROOPS IN KUWAIT CONTINUE TO BE DEFENSIVE AND RELATIVELY UNCHANGED FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS. ALTHOUGH THIS COULD CHANGE AT SHORT NOTICE IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT AN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IS LIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.
3. POLITICAL SITUATION. MIN(DP), THE HON ALAN CLARK MP, CONTINUED HIS VISIT TO THE GULF AREA. HIS VISIT TO BAHRAIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, HE OBTAINED BAHRAINI AGREEMENT TO THE ROTATION OF RAF AIRCRAFT AND CLARIFIED OTHER DETAILS. MR CLARK WAS IN ABU DHABI EARLIER TODAY, WHERE HE MET THE PRESIDENT AND CROWN PRINCE BEFORE TRAVELLING ON TO DUBAI FOR A MEETING WITH THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE. HE RETURNS TO THE UK TONIGHT. CONCERN CONTINUES TO GROW AT IRAQI THREATS TO MOVE UK AND OTHER NATIONALS HELD IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ TO MILITARY AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS. EGYPT HAS FORMALLY CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE ON 26 AUG. THE COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM REPORTS TODAY THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM IN KUWAIT ARE FIT AND WELL. UK EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD HAS STILL NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM THERE. IT IS REPORTED THAT BRITISH WIVES HAD JOINED THEIR HUSBANDS BUT IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE TEAM REMAIN IN THE HOTEL OR HAVE BEEN MOVED ELSEWHERE.
4. US DISPOSITIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US AIR FORCE DISPOSITIONS. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE US HAS ACTIVATED STAGE 1 OF THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET MEASURES TO HELP CARRY CARGO AND TROOPS ON OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THE FLEET CONSISTS OF COMMERCIAL PLANES FROM 29 US COMPANIES AND FOR STAGE 1 INVOLVES SOME 38 AIRCRAFT.
- THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO IN-THEATRE TROOP DISPOSITIONS. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US NAVY DISPOSITIONS.
5. ROYAL NAVY OPERATIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED WITH YORK AND BATTLEAXE ON PATROL IN THE SOUTHERN GULF AND JUPITER DUE TO RESUME HER PATROL

PAGE 1
SECRET

SECRET

077430
MDADAN 0106

LATER TODAY. RFA ORANGELEAF WILL BE AT FUJAYRAH UNTIL SUNDAY. THE PICTURE FOR OTHER NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE GULF IS UNCHANGED. OF NOTE IS THE FOLLOWING NAVAL INCIDENT OBSERVED FROM AN ON-TASK NIMROD-UNIT MONITORED THE USS REID FIRING SHOTS ACROSS THE BOW OF AN IRAQI TANKER OUTBOUND FROM THE GULF.

6. RAF OPERATIONS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE IN-THEATRE AIR ASSETS. THE JAGUARS PLANNED TO FLY SOME 16 TRAINING SORTIES TODAY AND THE F3S FROM CYPRUS WERE UK-BOUND WITH TANKER SUPPORT.

7. LOGISTICS. THE OVERALL THE LOGISTIC SITUATION REMAINS SATISFACTORY AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT A MEDICAL SURGICAL TEAM IS DEPLOYING TO DHAHRAN TODAY.

8. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT

BT

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

22

ADVANCE 22

IRAQ/KUWAIT SECRET

PS

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/MRS CHALKER

PS/PUS

MR TOMKYS

MR GOULDEN

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR YOUNG (EMERGENCY UNIT)

HD/NENAD

HD/UND

HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/AMD

HD/PUSD

DEPUTY HD/PUSD

HD/ISD(O)

MR BERMAN (LEGAL ADVISERS)

PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADDOCK 10 DOWNING ST

CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF

(CABINET OFFICE)

RESIDENT CLERK

NNNN

PAGE 2
SECRET



fax copy below

SECRET UK EYES A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3

MO6/17/15

18~~th~~ August 1990

PRIME MINISTER

Dear Dominic

Ministers have agreed revised ROE to cover the extension of ARMILLA Patrol operations to include the enforcement, if necessary, of the UN embargo against Iraq and Kuwait (subject to two outstanding detailed provisos contained in your letter to me of 15 August - these are dealt with below). It will be necessary to amplify this with clear guidance to commanders on the spot on the manner in which they are to conduct monitoring and enforcement operations, especially in circumstances where they may not have time to consult London for advice or instructions. (If we receive good advance intelligence relating to a particular vessel it will of course be possible to provide specific instructions to ARMILLA and, indeed, to take action with the flag state or charterer if appropriate). I attach amplifying instructions which have been prepared in consultation with the FCO, Legal Advisers and the Law Officers' Department and approved by my Secretary of State.

There are two points to bring out. First, the instructions assume that it is HMG's instruction to stop all embargoed cargos (and not simply oil). This is entirely consistent with the Government's public statements but, as far as I am aware, there has not been an explicit decision that RN enforcement action should extend to all types of cargo (other than the very limited permitted exemptions). Although identifying non-oil sanctions breaking involves greater difficulties - including the definition of genuine exemptions - the Defence Secretary believes that we should include all cargoes.

This brings me to the second point. The operating instructions envisage that force should not be used where it is not possible to establish clearly that a particular ship is acting in breach of the embargo. This is not likely to be a significant problem in relation to outbound ships but it may be difficult in some circumstances to demonstrate an inbound ship is bound for Iraq or Kuwait, or to disprove claims that some or all of its cargo is exempt with sufficient confidence to justify the use of force. Quite apart from the legal aspects, there would be a risk of serious presentational damage and of loss of international support for the embargo, if Iraq could plausibly claim that force had been used against an "innocent vessel".

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

SECRET UK EYES A

(2) B

SECRET UK EYES A



The Prime Minister's two outstanding provisos related to the IAZ and enforcement action in the territorial waters of coastal states. On the first we have as yet had no authoritative response from the Iranians (although given the breakthrough in peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq, the future of the IAZ may in any case be limited). For the moment the Defence Secretary believes that it would be prudent not to extend the scale of our operations in the IAZ (or to overfly it with Nimrod aircraft) unless we receive a positive indication from the Iranians (although the position will be kept under review). It is therefore intended that ARMILLA ships should simply transit through the IAZ as they have done for some time, monitoring merchant shipping as they do so. ARMILLA will not be permitted to intercept ships within the IAZ without specific authorisation from London.

We have asked the FCO to follow up the matter of enforcement in the territorial waters of coastal states and will amend instructions to ARMILLA as and when permissions are obtained. It is proposed that these procedures (and the associated ROE) will come into force at 1200Z on Sunday 19 August.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

J R BINSTEAD
(Private Secretary)

SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET UK EYES A

C (3)

AMPLIFYING INSTRUCTIONS ON MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
EMBARGO BY RN VESSELS

Introduction

1. The task is to contribute to the multinational effort to monitor all shipping in order to confirm the effectiveness of the UN embargo on trade with Iraq, to identify possible embargo breaking vessels, and, if necessary, take action to enforce the embargo.

Monitoring

2. All merchant ships encountered are to be notified to MOD(UK)(N) stating name, position, last and next ports of call and, where appropriate, its trading schedule within the Gulf. Wherever possible draught marks of tankers are to be reported.

3. An Embargo Surveillance Centre has been set up in the Department of Transport London with responsibility for coordinating information from all sources on all trade to and from Iraq and Kuwait. There is to be a maritime cell within this organisation with the specific aim of providing Naval and MPA units within theatre with intelligence on possible sanctions breakers.

Embargoed cargoes

4. All cargoes, including food, bound for or from Iraq or Kuwait are embargoed, with the exception of inbound medical supplies and foodstuffs identified by HMG as being for humanitarian purposes.

Enforcement Action

5. Where advance intelligence is available in relation to a particular vessel specific instructions will normally be

SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET UK EYES A

D (4)

signalled.

6. Where no specific instructions have been received but where there is clear evidence of a breach of sanctions - for example where a laden tanker is identified outbound from Iraq or Kuwait or where a vessel admits to being inbound for Iraq or Kuwait with a cargo not covered by a specific exemption (see para 4 above) - the vessel is to be informed that it is in breach of sanctions, that it will be reported to the UN and appropriate governments and that it is to be diverted to a destination other than Iraq/Kuwait (if inbound) or forbidden to proceed further (if outbound). Minimum necessary force may be used to secure compliance within the limits and procedures laid down in the Rules of Engagement which have been issued. If a suspect vessel refuses to comply with instructions even after the full range of action permitted by the ROE, it is to be shadowed as far as practicable and urgent instructions sought from MOD(UK).

7. If a commander has reason to believe that a vessel may be acting in breach of sanctions he is to inform the vessel concerned and seek its cooperation in clarifying the position. Depending on the response given and the circumstances, this may require seeking to put a party on board the suspect vessel, within the limits and procedures laid down in the ROE, to inspect documents and/or cargo. The situation should be reported to MOD(UK)N immediately and, if time permits, further detailed guidance sought.

Inbound Ships

8. Where evidence of embargo breaking is inconclusive - such as where an unexpected vessel claims that it is carrying exempted cargo or is bound for ports other than in Iraq or Kuwait - the following procedure is to be followed:

- (a) If a vessel refuses to cooperate it is to be informed that this will be reported to the UN and, if known and

SECRET UK EYES A

SECRET UK EYES A

E (5)

where appropriate, flag state and/or the state of the charterer;

(b) The vessel is to be shadowed for as long as practicable to allow time for further instructions to be sought from MOD(UK);

(c) Force is not to be used unless specifically authorised by MOD(UK).

9. Outbound Ships

(a) A vessel may be allowed to proceed if it is established that it is empty. In such cases the circumstances should be reported immediately both to MOD(UK) and to units of other national forces engaged in sanctions monitoring;

(b) Where there is doubt as to whether or not a vessel is carrying cargo or whether the cargo is outbound from Iraq or Kuwait, the vessel may be instructed to accept a boarding party and, if it refuses, enforcement action may be taken within the limits and procedures laid down in the ROE. Alternatively, if the element of doubt is considerable and to allow time for further investigation and, where appropriate, contact with the flag state or charterer the ship may be allowed to proceed. MOD(UK) should be informed immediately and other units operating in the area alerted to ensure that a further interception can be achieved.

SECRET UK EYES A

1990-08-19 07:57

P.02

55A
SECRET UK EYES A

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

MAIN BUILDING WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB

Telephone 071-21 82111/3



MO6/17/15

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Ministers have agreed revised ROE to cover the extension of ARMILLA Patrol operations to include the enforcement, if necessary, of the UN embargo against Iraq and Kuwait (subject to two outstanding detailed provisos contained in your letter to me of 15 August - these are dealt with below). It will be necessary to amplify this with clear guidance to commanders on the spot on the manner in which they are to conduct monitoring and enforcement operations, especially in circumstances where they may not have time to consult London for advice or instructions. (If we receive good advance intelligence relating to a particular vessel it will of course be possible to provide specific instructions to ARMILLA and, indeed, to take action with the flag state or charterer if appropriate). I attach amplifying instructions which have been prepared in consultation with the FCO, Legal Advisers and the Law Officers' Department and approved by my Secretary of State.

There are two points to bring out. First, the instructions assume that it is HMG's instruction to stop all embargoed cargos (and not simply oil). This is entirely consistent with the Government's public statements but, as far as I am aware, there has not been an explicit decision that RN enforcement action should extend to all types of cargo (other than the very limited permitted exemptions). Although identifying non-oil sanctions breaking involves greater difficulties - including the definition of genuine exemptions - the Defence Secretary believes that we should include all cargoes.

This brings me to the second point. The operating instructions envisage that force should not be used where it is not possible to establish clearly that a particular ship is acting in breach of the embargo. This is not likely to be a significant problem in relation to outbound ships but it may be difficult in some circumstances to demonstrate an inbound ship is bound for Iraq or Kuwait, or to disprove claims that some or all of its cargo is exempt with sufficient confidence to justify the use of force. Quite apart from the legal aspects, there would be a risk of serious presentational damage and of loss of international support for the embargo, if Iraq could plausibly claim that force had been used against an "innocent vessel".

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

1990-08-19 07:58

P.03

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The Prime Minister's two outstanding provisos related to the IAZ and enforcement action in the territorial waters of coastal states. On the first we have as yet had no authoritative response from the Iranians (although given the breakthrough in peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq, the future of the IAZ may in any case be limited). For the moment the Defence Secretary believes that it would be prudent not to extend the scale of our operations in the IAZ (or to overfly it with Nimrod aircraft) unless we receive a positive indication from the Iranians (although the position will be kept under review). It is therefore intended that ARMILLA ships should simply transit through the IAZ as they have done for some time, monitoring merchant shipping as they do so. ARMILLA will not be permitted to intercept ships within the IAZ without specific authorisation from London.

We have asked the FCO to follow up the matter of enforcement in the territorial waters of coastal states and will amend instructions to ARMILLA as and when permissions are obtained. It is proposed that these procedures (and the associated ROE) will come into force at 1200Z on Sunday 19 August.

I am sending copies of this letter to Richard Gozney (FCO) and Elisabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers Department), and to Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely

J R Binstead

J R BINSTead
(Private Secretary)

SECRET UK EYES A



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3076</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Letter from Binoread to Morris dated 18 August 1990, with enclosures.</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>3 January 2017</i> <i>A Wayland</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

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(12)

FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS LINE

As the Foreign Secretary said yesterday, preventing foreign citizens from leaving Kuwait and Iraq is illegal and is the tactic of the outlaw down the ages.

Any attempt to enforce this threat would be completely unacceptable and contrary to all norms of international behaviour .

We will continue to work for freedom of movement for foreign nationals and for their freedom to leave Iraq and Kuwait.

We will not be satisfied until there is a safe and orderly evacuation of those who wish to leave.

18 August 1990

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ADVANCE COPY

*Prime Minister**Gorbachev's
statement on the
situation
DSS.*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1535

OF 180800Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, ROME, PARIS, BONN, *situation*

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, ACTOR, BAGHDAD, RIYADH, CAIRO, UKDEL NATO,

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN

INFO PRIORITY OTHER EC POSTS, PEKING, TOKYO, NEW DELHI,

INFO PRIORITY OTHER MIDDLE EAST POSTS, UKMIS GENEVA

SIC

IRAQ/KUWAIT: STATEMENT BY SOVIET LEADERSHIP, 17 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. IN HIS FIRST PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE CRISIS GORBACHEV CONDEMNS IRAQ AND FEARS A CHAIN REACTION. HE CALLS FOR COLLECTIVE EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE GULF CONFLICT.

2. SHEVARDNADZE SEPARATELY PLEDGES SOVIET COOPERATION WITH ALL MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

3. EVACUATION OF SOVIET CITIZENS TO JORDAN UNDER WAY. SHEVARDNADZE REFERS TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQ, AND EXPRESSES RELUCTANCE TO CLOSE SOVIET EMBASSY IN KUWAIT.

DETAIL

4. ON 17 AUGUST GORBACHEV MADE A SPEECH, MAINLY ON INTERNAL MATTERS, TO SERVICEMEN IN ODESSA - HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE GOING ON HOLIDAY ON 30 JULY. HE INCLUDED A SHORT PASSAGE ON THE GULF. THE FULL TEXT HAS YET TO BE PUBLISHED, BUT GORBAHCEV'S MAIN POINTS WERE:

- A) A CALL FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO PREVENT ESCALATION INTO A FULL-SCALE MILITARY CONFRONTATION.
- B) THE USSR WOULD ACT 'SOLELY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE EFFORTS...WE COUNT ON THE REASON AND RESPONSIBILITY OF ARAB STATES AND THEIR REGIONAL ORGANISATION. WE RELY ON THE POWERS AND RIGHTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATIONS AND SECURITY COUNCIL'.
- C) STRONG CONDEMNATION OF IRAQ: 'WE HAVE WITNESSED AN ACT OF PERFIDY AND A BLATANT VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN CHARTER - IN SHORT, A VIOLATION OF EVERYTHING THE WORLD COMMUNITY NOW PINS ITS HOPES ON AS IT SEEKS TO PUT CIVILISATION

PAGE 1
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077006
MDADAN 0043ON THE TRACKS OF PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT'.

- D) NEED TO PREVENT A CHAIN REACTION: 'IT IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO STOP MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND PREVENT THEM FROM SPREADING TO OTHER COUNTRIES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RESTORE RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW... THE USE OF FORCE TO REDRAW BORDERS, ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO ANNEX A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY, THREATENS A PERILOUS CHAIN REACTION ENDANGERING THE WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY'.
- E) JUSTIFICATION OF SOVIET STANCE: 'FOR US TO REACT IN A DIFFERENT WAY WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE UNACCEPTABLE AS THE ACT OF AGGRESSION WAS COMMITTED WITH THE HELP OF OUR WEAPONS, WHICH WE AGREED TO SELL TO IRAQ ONLY TO MAINTAIN ITS DEFENCE CAPABILITY RATHER THAN TO SEIZE FOREIGN TERRITORIES AND WHOLE COUNTRIES.'

SHEVARDNADZE

5. AT HIS JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH GENSCHER ON THE SAME EVENING, SHEVARDNADZE CALLED FOR 'ENERGETIC COLLECTIVE EFFORTS' AND SAID THAT USE OF THE UN MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE COULD GIVE 'A DIFFERENT WEIGHT AND DIFFERENT RESULTS' TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. SHEVARDNADZE SAID: 'WE ARE UNANIMOUS THAT ALL STATES, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY SHOULD PROMOTE AND TAKE ALL MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED TO THE FULL. THIS IS NOT AN EASY TASK AND WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN THIS RESPECT.'

6. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS, SHEVARDNADZE:

- A) DESCRIBED THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES IN SAUDI ARABIA AS 'TEMPORARY'
- B) FORECAST FURTHER RESOLUTE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION IF THE CRISIS PERSISTED
- C) EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO CLOSE THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

7. MFA SPOKESMAN SAID ON 17 AUGUST THAT:

- A) FIRST GROUP OF 230 SOVIET EVACUEES FROM KUWAIT HAD LEFT BAGHDAD THAT MORNING AND WAS DUE IN AMMAN ON THE EVENING OF 18 AUGUST
- B) SECOND GROUP (123, INCLUDING 27 WOMEN AND 23 CHILDREN) REACHED BAGHDAD ON 17 AUGUST, WOULD LEAVE FOR JORDANIAN BORDER ON 19 AUGUST.
- C) THIRD GROUP TO LEAVE KUWAIT ON 19 AUGUST.

LOGAN

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PAGE 2
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PRIME MINISTER (8)

The Iraqi speaker's statement
 (according to the Iraqi press)

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MDADAN 0036

ADVANCE COPY

DJS.

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FM BAGHDAD

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 854

OF 180600Z AUGUST 90

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS, ME POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PEKING, MOSCOW, MODUK, ACTOR

SIC 19M

INTERNMENT

SUMMARY

1. AS WAS ACCURATELY SUMMARISED BY THE BBC WORLD SERVICE THIS MORNING, THE SPEAKER OF THE IRAQI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS SAID (ACCORDING TO TODAY'S PRESS, THOUGH THERE IS NO MENTION IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE BAGHDAD OBSERVER) THAT NATIONALS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES DESCRIBED AS INTENDING AGGRESSION AGAINST IRAQ ARE TO BE INTERNED.

DETAIL

2. SA'DI MAHDI SALIH SAID (PRESUMABLY YESTERDAY) THAT CERTAIN WESTERN GOVERNMENTS THAT INTENDED TO TAKE HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST IRAQ, PARTICULARLY THE US, HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT OF THE PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TAKEN TO KEEP THE CITIZENS OF THOSE GOVERNMENTS IN IRAQ AND ON THE BASIS OF IT HAD STIRRED UP A CAMPAIGN FULL OF FABRICATIONS.

3. THE WHOLE WORLD KNEW THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAD ASSEMBLED FORCES IN THE REGION IN AN UNPRECEDENTED WAY, WERE INTENDING TO COMMIT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND WERE BEHAVING WITH AN ARROGANCE THAT BROKE ALL THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMANITARIAN DEALINGS. SIMILARLY THEY INTENDED A WAR OF STARVATION AGAINST THE IRAQI PEOPLE.

4. A PRIMARY DUTY WAS TO PROTECT PEOPLES FROM AGGRESSION AND TO ENSURE PEACE: ANYTHING THAT IN THE END SERVED THIS NOBLE AIM ACQUIRED A FUNDAMENTAL LEGALITY THAT WAS THE ESSENCE OF HEAVENLY AND EARTHLY LAWS AND OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

5. ACCORDINGLY THE IRAQI PEOPLE HAD DECIDED TO KEEP AS THEIR

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1990-08-18 11:28

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MDADAN 0036

GUESTS THE CITIZENS IN IRAQ OF THE HOSTILE COUNTRIES IN QUESTION
SO LONG AS IRAQ WAS THREATENED WITH AGGRESSIVE WAR. THE MEASURE
WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL TANGIBLE AND ADEQUATE GUARANTEES
WERE SUBMITTED TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE THAT THE DANGER OF
AGGRESSION AGAINST THEM HAD PASSED.

6. THE IRAQI PEOPLE CONSIDERED THAT THIS MEASURE WOULD KEEP WAR
AWAY AND SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE. ALL GOOD PEOPLE IN THE WORLD
SHOULD USE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO PERSUADE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
US AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES THAT WERE PARTICIPATING WITH IT IN
PLANNING AGGRESSION TO ABANDON THEIR AGGRESSIVE POLICY AND LEAVE
THE REGION IN PEACE.

7. THE SPEAKER SAID THAT THE ASSEMBLY WAS COORDINATING WITH A
NUMBER OF MINISTRIES AND STATE ORGANISATIONS THAT HAD THE
CAPACITY TO KEEP THE FOREIGNERS AS THEIR GUESTS IN ESTABLISHMENTS
ANYWHERE IN IRAQ FROM ZAKHO TO AL-NIDA-, FOR EXAMPLE ESTABLISHMENTS
BELONGING TO THE MINISTRY OF OIL AND THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY
AND MILITARY MANUFACTURE AND THE ARMED FORCES, SUCH AS AIR BASES
AND THE REFINERY COMPLEX IN KUWAIT.

WALKER

YYYY

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37 73.

IRAQ/KUWAIT
PS
PS/MR WALDEGRAVE
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
~~MR GORE-BOOTH~~
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
~~HD/EEB~~
HD/SOVIET D
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/ACDD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK
MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND(2)
~~EMERGENCY UNIT~~
RESIDENT CLERK

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FM KUWAIT
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 427

ADVANCE COPY

PRIME MINISTER

OF 181330Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH MODUK WASHINGTON ACTOR BAGHDAD
INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS ME POSTS UKMIS GENEVA UKMIS NEW YORKto be aware.
DSS

MY TELNO 426: CONSULAR ADVICE.

1. TOGETHER WITH THE US AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS AND THE FRENCH CHARGE I CALLED ON AL DOURI THIS AFTERNOON TO PROTEST ABOUT THE MEASURES THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN AT THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL HOTEL.
2. AL DOURI SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE HOLDING PEOPLE IN HOTELS INITIALLY TO CHECK THEIR PERSONAL PARTICULARS AND ESTABLISH THEIR STATUS. THEREAFTER, THEY WOULD BE MOVED TO MILITARY AND OTHER KEY SITES IN KUWAIT. THE IRAQIS HAD REASON TO FEAR AN ISRAELI ATTACK. AND THERE WERE RELIABLE REPORTS FROM PARIS THAT AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO RESCUE PEOPLE FROM THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL AND REGENCY PALACE HOTELS.
3. WE PROTESTED STRONGLY AT THIS UNACCEPTABLE ACTION, WHICH AL-DOURI SAID WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENT BY THE IRAQI SPEAKER (BAGHDAD TELNO 854). I ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS IRAQI GOVERNMENT POLICY (YOUR TELNO 508 TO BAGHDAD) AND AL DOURI SAID HE ASSURED US IT WAS. ASKED WHETHER OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FOUR COMMUNITIES WOULD ALSO BE SENT TO SITES OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE HE CONFIRMED THIS WAS THE CASE. BUT THEY WOULD BEGIN WITH THOSE IN HOTELS.

COMMENT

4. WE ARE ADVISING PEOPLE TO STAY AT HOME AND IT MAY THEREFORE BE SOME TIME BEFORE LARGE NUMBERS ARE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY. AS I LEFT THE IRAQI EMBASSY, HOWEVER, I MET 13 BRITS WHO HAD BEEN PICKED UP IN THE DESERT, HAVING FAILED IN AN ATTEMPT TO CROSS INTO SAUDI ARABIA (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM). THE EFFECT ON THE COMMUNITY'S MORALE WILL BE CATASTROPHIC. MY US COLLEAGUE SAID TO AL DOURI, IT WILL GREATLY INCREASE TENSION IN THE AREA.

WESTON

PAGE 1
CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIALPRIME MINISTERIRAQ

You will have seen the press reports and telegrams sent down to you about the detention of foreign nationals. I have been in touch with the Foreign Office over the course of the morning. I thought you might like to know the latest information we have and how the Foreign Secretary is handling the situation.

You may have heard on the latest news bulletin that there are Iraqi reports of foreign nationals now being moved. These are rumours and we have no confirmation of them. We have heard in the last half hour or so that the American Ambassador was told by the Iraqi Ambassador to Kuwait that US nationals attempting to leave the country would be shot. However, the Iraqis say that US nationals would not be rounded up.

We are still urgently seeking information on who is covered by this announcement. There was a report on the one o'clock news that the two million Egyptians in Iraq and Kuwait are exempt. I am told by the Foreign Office that the press say that there will be a statement by the Iraqi Minister of Labour about the position at 4 o'clock. They assume this is 4 o'clock our time.

The UK have made strong protests to the Iraqi Ambassador in London. The Foreign Secretary is planning to put down a further statement of his own along similar lines to the Foreign Office statement you have already seen. More generally, the Foreign Secretary thinks that we should allow the UN Secretary General time to pursue his initiative. This would also appear to be the US view though we are still getting information on the US position - they have of course been asleep through much of the morning.

The Foreign Secretary thinks that the next step may be to approach the UN for a Resolution, perhaps going more widely than simply the position on hostages. He thinks this is probably the US position too.

Yesterday Cranley Onslow spoke to the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Secretary had asked for an account of the conversation to be relayed to you. Mr Onslow said that he thought Parliament should be recalled now for a one day session. He did not think that we could last until October; and he thought it would be useful to discuss the position on UK hostages. The Foreign Secretary has spoken to the Lord President, who is in Queensland; the Lord President said that from such a distance it was difficult to judge. But in his view, it was not necessary yet to recall Parliament. The Foreign Secretary will want to speak to you about this tomorrow when he sees you.

I will keep you in touch with any further significant developments.

Caroline Slocock

18 August 1990

1990-08-18 14:05 CORNWALL PRIMARY

0841 521108 P.03

CONFIDENTIALPRIME MINISTERIRAQ

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1990-08-18 14:06 CORNWALL PRIMARY

0841 521108 P.03

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Caroline Slocock

18 August 1990

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FM JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELNO U/N
OF 181955Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE CINCFLEET
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKLF
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET DHAHRAN
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET THUMRAIT

ADVANCE COPY

PRIME MINISTER
A more pessimistic
view from SHQ
JSS. 19/8.

SIC I9M/IAG
OPERATION GRANBY
MODUK FOR DROW

JOINT COMMANDERS ASSESSREP 008/AUG EFDI 181800Z AUG
COVERING PERIOD 171800Z AUG TO 181800Z AUG

1. GENERAL SITUATION. ATTENTION CONTINUES TO FOCUS ON THE ISSUE OF WESTERN CITIZENS IN IRAQ. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THEY WILL BE DISPERSED TO SITES WITHIN IRAQ, WHICH THE IRAQIS BELIEVE THE WEST REGARD AS HIGH VALUE TARGETS. MILITARILY, THE IRAQI GROUND FORCE BUILD UP CONTINUES. US WARSHIPS HAVE FIRED SHOTS ACROSS THE BOWS OF AN IRAQI MERCHANT SHIP IN THE GULF.

2. ENEMY SITUATION. IN KUWAIT, IRAQI DEPLOYMENTS HAVE PRODUCED A FORCE STRUCTURE SUITED TO EITHER ATTACK OR DEFENCE. ELEMENTS OF 5 MECH DIV HOLD THE RIGHT FLANK AND ELEMENTS OF 6 ARMD DIV ARE REPORTED TO BE MOVING INTO POSITION ON THE LEFT FLANK. THESE NEW DISPOSITIONS AND THE FACT THAT THESE DIVS ARE NOW FULLY FORMED IN KUWAIT WILL GIVE THE IRAQIS THE OPTION TO ATTACK AT VERY SHORT NOTICE. IRAQI AIR ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTH EAST OF THE COUNTRY AND OVER KUWAIT IS SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN OF LATE.

3. OWN SITUATION.

A. NAVAL SITUATION. AS REPORTED BY CINCFLEET.

B. AIR/MARITIME AIR SITUATION. 1. THE 12 TORNADO F3 AT DHAHRAN CONTINUE IN THEATRE TRAINING. OF THE 6 PHANTOM F4 AT AKROTIRI 2 ARE ON QRA, AT 10 MINS READINESS BY DAY AND 1 HR BY NIGHT. THE REMAINING TORNADO F3 HAVE NOW RECOVERED TO THE UK. 20 SQN RAF REGT IS EXPECTED TO BE PROVIDING SHORAD AT AKROTIRI BY 190500Z AUG USING 4 RAPIER FIRE UNITS. THE JAGUAR DET AT THUMRAIT FLEW ALL 12 AIRCRAFT TODAY. ON 19 AUG IT IS PLANNED FOR 2 JAGUAR AND 1 VC10K TO VISIT BAHRAIN. FOUR JAGUAR AND 1 VC10K ARE AT 1 HR READINESS. TWO OF THE 3 NIMRODS AT SEEB FLEW SURFACE SURVEILLANCE SORTIES TODAY. THE SECOND MONITORED (ELECTRONICALLY) THE INCIDENT IN WHICH THE USS

PAGE 1
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MDADAN 0108

REID AND USS GAINSBOROUGH FIRED SHOTS ACROSS THE BOWS OF THE IRAQI TANKER KHANAQIN. POOR DATA CONNECTIVITY IS HAMPERING THE CO-ORDINATION OF OPERATIONS WITH THE SURFACE FLEET. 2. NIL 3. NIL. C. LAND SITUATION. 1. NIL. 2. NIL. 3. NIL.

4. ASSESSMENT. IT IS ASSESSED THAT AN IRAQI ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IS POSSIBLE WITHIN 8-12 HRS BUT, GIVEN THE LACK OF ANY LARGE SCALE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF OFFENSIVE AIR ASSETS, WHICH IS CONSIDERED TO BE A PRECURSOR TO AN ATTACK, IT IS THOUGHT TO BE UNLIKELY.

5. INTENTIONS.

A. TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING SORTIES FROM ALL 3 ESTABLISHED BASES.

B. TO PROVIDE SHORAD AT AKROTIRI.

C. TO RESOLVE ROE PROBLEMS TO PERMIT FULL TORNADO F3 PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED AD OPERATIONS.

D. TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HQ AT RIYADH.

E. TO ENHANCE LIAISON WITH ALLIED FORCES AS NECESSARY.

F. TO PROVIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO DEPLOYED UNITS.

6. MISSION PRIORITIES. NO CHANGE TO ASSESSREP 001/AUG.

BT

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IRAQ/KUWAIT

PS

PS/MR WALDEGRAVE

PS/MRS CHALKER

PS/PUS

MR TOMKYS

MR GORE-BOOTH

MR FAIRWEATHER

MR GOULDEN

HD/MED

HD/NENAD

HD/NAD

HD/EED

HD/SOVIET D

HD/SED

HD/UND

HD/ACDD

HD/SECPOL D

HD/AMD

HD/ECDE

MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY

MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE

MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE

MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE

(BY TUBE H29)

PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST

SIR P CRADOCK,

(NO 10 DOWNING ST)

CABINET OFFICE DIO

(BY TUBE H29)

SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE

AUS (C) MODUK

HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

MR LS SMITH BANK ENGLAND

PAGE 2

SECRET

TOTAL P.06

SECRET

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MDADAN 0106

SECRET
FM MODUK
TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116
TELNO U/N
OF 182359Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH

PRIME MINISTER
Still no sign of an
imminent offensive.
ADVANCE COPY

055 19/8.

SIC I9M
CRDA 0903

OPERATION GRANBY GENERAL SITREP EIGHT

18 AUG 1990

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION REPORT FOR OPERATION GRANBY WILL BE ISSUED DAILY AT 2359Z. ADDRESSEES SHOULD DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WITHIN THEIR COMMANDS AS THEY REQUIRE.

2. INTELLIGENCE. IT IS ASSESSED THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS OF IRAQI TROOPS IN KUWAIT CONTINUE TO BE DEFENSIVE AND RELATIVELY UNCHANGED FROM PREVIOUS REPORTS. ALTHOUGH THIS COULD CHANGE AT SHORT NOTICE IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT AN ATTACK ON SAUDI ARABIA IS LIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

3. POLITICAL SITUATION. MIN(DP), THE HON ALAN CLARK MP, CONTINUED HIS VISIT TO THE GULF AREA. HIS VISIT TO BAHRAIN IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL, HE OBTAINED BAHRAINI AGREEMENT TO THE ROTATION OF RAF AIRCRAFT AND CLARIFIED OTHER DETAILS. MR CLARK WAS IN ABU DHABI EARLIER TODAY, WHERE HE MET THE PRESIDENT AND CROWN PRINCE BEFORE TRAVELLING ON TO DUBAI FOR A MEETING WITH THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF DEFENCE. HE RETURNS TO THE UK TONIGHT. CONCERN CONTINUES TO GROW AT IRAQI THREATS TO MOVE UK AND OTHER NATIONALS HELD IN KUWAIT AND IRAQ TO MILITARY AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS. EGYPT HAS FORMALLY CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE ARAB LEAGUE ON 26 AUG. THE COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM REPORTS TODAY THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM IN KUWAIT ARE FIT AND WELL. UK EMBASSY IN BAGHDAD HAS STILL NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO VISIT THE MEMBERS OF THE TEAM THERE. IT IS REPORTED THAT BRITISH WIVES HAD JOINED THEIR HUSBANDS BUT IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE TEAM REMAIN IN THE HOTEL OR HAVE BEEN MOVED ELSEWHERE.

4. US DISPOSITIONS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US AIR FORCE DISPOSITIONS. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE US HAS ACTIVITATED STAGE 1 OF THE CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET MEASURES TO HELP CARRY CARGO AND TROOPS ON OPERATIONS IN THE GULF. THE FLEET CONSISTS OF COMMERCIAL PLANES FROM 29 US COMPANIES AND FOR STAGE 1 INVOLVES SOME 38 AIRCRAFT.

THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO IN-THEATRE TROOP DISPOSITIONS. THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE US NAVY DISPOSITIONS.

5. ROYAL NAVY OPERATIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED WITH YORK AND BATTLEAXE ON PATROL IN THE SOUTHERN GULF AND JUPITER DUE TO RESUME HER PATROL

PAGE 1
SECRET

But 3 members
picked up by
Iraqis?

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LATER TODAY. RFA ORANGELEAF WILL BE AT FUJAYRAH UNTIL SUNDAY. THE PICTURE FOR OTHER NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE GULF IS UNCHANGED. OF NOTE IS THE FOLLOWING NAVAL INCIDENT OBSERVED FROM AN ON-TASK NIMROD-UNIT MONITORED THE USS REID FIRING SHOTS ACROSS THE BOW OF AN IRAQI TANKER OUTBOUND FROM THE GULF.

6. RAF OPERATIONS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE IN-THEATRE AIR ASSETS. THE JAGUARS PLANNED TO FLY SOME 16 TRAINING SORTIES TODAY AND THE F3S FROM CYPRUS WERE UK-BOUND WITH TANKER SUPPORT.

7. LOGISTICS. THE OVERALL THE LOGISTIC SITUATION REMAINS SATISFACTORY AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT A MEDICAL SURGICAL TEAM IS DEPLOYING TO DHAHRAN TODAY.

8. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT

BT

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FM KUWAIT

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 431

OF 181915Z AUGUST 90

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PRIME MINISTER
Not clear if they were
picked up because they
were GAT members.
DTS

BONN TELNO 532; FOREIGN COMMUNITIES.

1. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT AT LEAST 27 BRITONS (PLUS 1 AMERICAN) HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO A MILITARY INSTALLATION ON THE JAHRA ROAD (KNOWN AS THE G1 COMPLEX). THEY WERE PICKED UP, SO WE UNDERSTAND, IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY DRIVING FOUR WHEEL DRIVE VEHICLES IN KUWAIT CITY. THOSE DETAINED DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN EXFILTRATION ATTEMPTS. AMONG THE 27 ARE THREE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH LIAISON TEAM: KEVIN FALLOW, CLIVE HALL AND BRIAN HUGHES 3 AND 8 DEPENDANTS, AND FIVE KEY EMPLOYEES WORKING FOR BEI WITH THE LOCAL ELECTRICITY GENERATION COMPANY. THEIR ABSENCE IS LIKELY TO CAUSE PROBLEMS IN POWER SUPPLY QUITE SOON.

2. WE ALSO NOW HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT 24 PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY FROM THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL IN TWO MINIBUSES (BREAKDOWN: 14 BRITONS, 5 AMERICANS, 4 GERMANS AND 1 FRENCHMAN). WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THEIR LIKELY DESTINATION BUT UNDERSTAND THE IRAQIS WILL GIVE THEM QUOTE VIP TREATMENT UNQUOTE. (IN ADDITION TO THE FIVE BRITONS REPORTED EARLIER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT NINE CREW MEMBERS/PASSENGERS FROM BA 149 WERE MOVED TO THE INTERNATIONAL FROM THE AIRPORT HOTEL.)

3. I CANNOT CONTACT AL DOURI TONIGHT, BUT WILL TRY TO DO SO IN THE MORNING. HE WILL NO DOUBT TELL ME, HOWEVER, THAT HE WARNED ME THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN AND THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HERE ARE SIMPLY FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS FROM BAGHDAD.

4. TELEGRAM FOLLOWS WITH NAMES OF BRITONS MOVED TO G1 COMPLEX.

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OF 181915Z AUGUST 90

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PRIME MINISTER
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picked up because they
were BLT members.
DTS.

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WESTON

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THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

13



FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

2 MARSHAM STREET LONDON SW1P 3EB
TELEPHONE 01-276 3000

Ms J R Binstead
Private Office
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall
LONDON
SW1A 2HB

My Ref: P/PSO/9685/90

Your Ref:

17 AUG 1990

Serial No: 1997

Copy No 2 of 5.

Dear Jane,

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO

Elizabeth Wilmshurst's letter of 13 August conveyed the Attorney General's advice in response to your letter of 11 August. There is little that my Secretary of State could add to that in relation to the action against foreign ships.

In the case of British ships we have power to search British flag ships, including dependent territory ships, under the Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) Orders and the Iraq and Kuwait (United Nations Sanctions) (Dependent Territories) Order. However, the power to search is restricted to Authorised Officers as referred to in Section 692(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, ie a commissioned officer on full pay in HM naval or military service, any officer of the Secretary of State for Transport, any officer of Customs or any British Consular officer. This would pose no problems for the Royal Navy. However, the power would not permit foreign states to stop and search British ships. If they did so they might be at risk of legal action from the ship owners/operators, though one would expect that if sued in their own Courts, they would be able to plead the equivalent to our defence of "Act of State", and if sued in UK Courts they would refuse to submit to UK jurisdiction, pleading sovereign immunity.

If that was not thought satisfactory, the UK could seek effectively to take upon itself the liability of the searching state by asking it to search the ship on our behalf ie as our agent. This would effectively transfer liability to the UK Government which would then itself be open to legal action, as the search would not have been carried out within the powers conferred by the Sanctions Order and the defence of "Act of State" is not available under UK law against UK citizens. This risk could be mitigated if the Sanctions Orders were to permit

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the UK Government to authorise other states to stop British ships in support of the embargo. However it is doubtful whether this would be worth a special amendment and perhaps need only be borne in mind if further Orders had to be made for some other reason.

Although, therefore, there appear to be no insuperable legal problems to permitting other nations to stop and search British ships, there are probably presentational advantages in not doing so at the present time and certainly not until we have good evidence of specific vessels being involved in sanctions breaking. Even in those cases it would be preferable to seek to use Royal Navy ships to stop and search if it is possible to do so. Good US/UK liaison could help.

British owned but foreign flagged ships are, of course, in the same position as foreign owned and flagged ships.

/ I am sending copies of this letter to Charles Powell (No. 10), Stephen Wall (FCO), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and to Sonia Phippard.

Yours sincerely

Simon Whiteley

S C WHITELEY
Private Secretary

SECRET UK EYES A



201 cjk
THE LEGAL SECRETARIAT TO THE LAW OFFICERS
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS
9 BUCKINGHAM GATE
LONDON SW1E 6JP

General enquiries 071-828 7155
Direct line 071-828 1368

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The Hon Dominic Asquith
P/S The Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

17 August 1990

Dear Dominic

IRAQ/KUWAIT: OIL EMBARGO

I refer to your letter of 15 August to Jane Binstead.

The draft RoE have now been agreed. The process of consultation on the draft did not give rise to questions about flag State consents. But the Attorney General has asked me to say that if such questions arise in the future he will be happy to look at the matter again. In such a case he will welcome the views of your lawyers and those of the MOD.

I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Jane Binstead and Sonia Phippard.

Yours faithfully
E S WILMSHURST

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1990-08-19 13:01

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General enquiries 071-828 7155
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The Hon Dominic Asquith
P/S The Rt Hon William Waldegrave MP
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

17 August 1990

Handwritten signature/initials

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I am copying this letter to Charles Powell, Jane Binstead and Sonia Phippard.

Handwritten signatures and initials

E S WILMSHURST

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FM JHQ HIGH WYCOMBE
TO IMMEDIATE MODUK
TELNO U/N
OF 171945Z AUGUST 90
AND TO IMMEDIATE CINCFLEET
AND TO IMMEDIATE UKLF
AND TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON
AND TO IMMEDIATE HQBFAP RIYADH
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET DHAHRAN
AND TO IMMEDIATE RAFDET THUMRAIT

~~SECRET~~ PRIME MINISTER

Yesterday's sitrep

— indications of moves
to improve defensiveADVANCE COPY position with
reinforcements

DJS.

SIC I9M/IAG
OPERATION GRANBY
MODUK FOR DROW

JOINT COMMANDERS ASSESSREP 007/AUG EFDI 171800Z AUG
COVERING PERIOD 161800Z AUG TO 171800Z AUG

1. GENERAL SITUATION. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL OR MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAST 12 HOURS. IN KUWAIT, IRAQI TROOPS CONTINUE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, PARTICULARLY ALONG THE COAST. MOVEMENTS THROUGH THE JORDANIAN PORT OF AQABA CONTINUE, BUT AT A REDUCED LEVEL AS THE EFFECT OF UN IMPOSED SANCTIONS BEGIN TO TAKE EFFECT

2. ENEMY SITUATION. IN KUWAIT, IRAQ IS CONTINUING TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE. ENGINEERING AND FORTIFICATION WORK CONTINUES ALONG THE COAST. ELEMENTS OF TWO REGULAR ARMY DIVISIONS, 5 MECH AND 6 ARMD HAVE ARRIVED IN KUWAIT. 5 MECH DIV IS CURRENTLY LOCATED IN SOUTH WEST KUWAIT AND 6 ARMD DIV NORTH OF AL JAHRA. THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF BOTH DIVISIONS ARE EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN KUWAIT IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS. THE ARRIVAL OF THESE REINFORCING UNITS GIVES IRAQ A STRENGTH SIMILAR TO THAT REQUIRED FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE IN THE IRAN IRAQ WAR. IN IRAQ, AT TAJI SSM STORAGE FACILITY, SCUD RELATED ACTIVITY IS CONTINUING. NO SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED AT THE THREE KNOWN SSM LAUNCH SITES. ASSESSMENT: IRAQI FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO REINFORCE AND IMPROVE THEIR DEFENCES ALONG THE COAST AND SAUDI BORDER, WHILE RETAINING THE CAPABILITY FOR FURTHER OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AT SHORT NOTICE

3. OWN SITUATION

A. NAVAL SITUATION. AS REPORTED BY CINCFLEET

B. AIR/MARITIME AIR SITUATION. 1. THE 12 TORNADO F3 AT DHAHRAN HAVE CARRIED OUT ROUTINE TRAINING: 8 SORTIES WERE FLOWN ON 16 AUG AND THAT RATE IS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. 6 RAFG F4 AIRCRAFT HAVE ARRIVED IN AKROTIRI AND WERE AT RS30 AT 171800Z AUG. THE 6 REMAINING F3S IN

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AKROTIRI ARE EXPECTED TO RECOVER TO UK ON 18 AUG. 8 RAPIER FUS OF 20 SQN RAF REGT ARRIVED IN AKROTIRI ON 17 AUG. THE THUMRAIT JAGUAR DETACHMENT HAVE BEEN HOLDING 4 AIRCRAFT AT ONE HOUR READINESS IN THE 4 TIMES CBU FIT. NO FLYING WAS PLANNED TODAY IN RESPECT OF THE OMANI SABBATH. THE NIMROD DETACHMENT AT SEEB WERE DUE TO FLY 2 SURFACE SURVEILLANCE SORTIES ON 17 AUG. THE FIRST SORTIE WAS AIRBORNE AT 0345Z 2. NIL 3. NIL

C. LAND SITUATION. 1. NIL. 2. NIL 3. NIL

4. ASSESSMENT. NO CHANGE FROM ASSESSREP 006/AUG

5. INTENTIONS

A. TO CARRY OUT OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING SORTIES FROM ALL 3 ESTABLISHED BASES

B. TO PROVIDE SHOARAD AT AKROTIRI

C. TO COMPLETE THE LOGISTIC BUILD UP

D. TO RESOLVE ROE PROBLEMS TO PERMIT FULL TORNADO F3 PARTICIPATION IN ALLIED AD OPERATIONS

E. TO CONTINUE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HQ AT RIYADH

F. TO ENHANCE LIAISON WITH ALLIED FORCES AS NECESSARY

6. MISSION PRIORITIES. NO CHANGE TO ASSESREP 001/AUG

BT

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HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
HD/SEC (O) (C) MODUK

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1990-08-18 11:22

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USLC

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FM MODUK

TO IMMEDIATE AIG 4116

TELNO U/N

OF 171140Z AUGUST 90

AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 5705

AND TO IMMEDIATE AIG 1125

AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF HONINGTON

AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF WITTERING

AND TO IMMEDIATE RAF MARHAM

AND TO IMMEDIATE FORV

AND TO IMMEDIATE COMTWOATAF

AND TO IMMEDIATE AFSOUTH

PRIME MINISTERPara 17 concluding
offensive action still
unlikely in short term

DJS.

SIC ACA/UZH/I9M

ATTENTION INTELLIGENCE DIVISIONS PD FROM DIS, DI(ROW), IRAQ CRISIS CELL.

OPERATION GRANBY INTELLIGENCE SITREP AS AT 160600Z AUG 90
MILITARY SITUATION IN KUWAIT1. (S) THE SEVEN REPUBLICAN GUARD FORCE COMMAND DIVISIONS KNOWN TO BE IN KUWAIT ARE:A. ARMOURED

(1) HAMURABI

(2) MEDINAH

B. MECHANISED

(1) TAWAKALNA

C. INFANTRY

(1) FAO

(2) BAGHDAD

(3) NEBUCHADNEZZAR

(4) ADNAN

2. (S) HAMURABI ARMOURED DIVISION.

A. IT IS THOUGHT TO HAVE:

(1) 7,12 INFANTRY BRIGADES.

(2) 15 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.

(3) 8,9,17 ARMOURED BRIGADES (IT IS LIKELY THAT THE 8 ARMOURED BRIGADE HAS BEEN REALLOCATED TO THE TAWAKALNA DIVISION).

B. THE HAMURABI IS THOUGHT TO BE HOLDING THE WHOLE OF THE SOUTHERN KUWAIT BORDER.

C. ALL BRIGADES OF THIS DIVISION WERE IDENTIFIED ON THE MOVE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE INVASION.

D. THIS DIVISION HAS BEEN REFERRED TO PREVIOUSLY AS A MECHANISED INFANTRY DIVISION.

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3. (S) THE MEDINAH ARMoured DIVISON.
 - A. IT CONSISTS OF:
 - (1) 2,10 ARMoured BRIGADES.
 - (2) 11 INFANTRY BRIGADE.
 - (3) 14 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
 - B. ALL BRIGADES EXCEPT 14 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE WERE OBSERVED ON THE MOVE.
4. (S) THE TAWAKALNA MECHANISED DIVISION.
 - A. THIS DIVISION PROBABLY CONSISTS OF ITS OWN 18 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE, 8 ARMoured BRIGADE DETACHED FROM HAMURABI AND THE PREVIOUSLY UNALLOCATED 1 ARMoured BRIGADE.
5. (S) THE FAO INFANTRY BRIGADE.
 - A. IT CONSISTS OF:
 - (1) 24 MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE.
 - (2) 25,27,28 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
 - B. ONLY THE 25 INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS OBSERVED.
6. (S) BAGHDAD INFANTRY DIVISION.
 - A. IT CONSISTS OF:
 - (1) 4,5,6 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
 - (2) 21 COMMANDO BRIGADE.
 - B. OF THESE BRIGADES ONLY THE COMMANDO BRIGADE WAS NOT OBSERVED PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
7. (S) NEBUCHADNEZZAR INFANTRY DIVISION.
 - A. IT CONSISTS OF 19,20,22,23 INFANTRY BRIGADES.
 - B. 19 AND 22 BRIGADES ONLY WERE OBSERVED PRIOR TO THE INVASION.
8. (S) ADNAN INFANTRY DIVISION.
 - A. NO INFORMATION IS HELD ON THE CONSTITUENT BRIGADES OF THIS DIVISION
9. (S) SPECIAL FORCES.
 - A. REPUBLICAN GUARD FORCE COMMAND HAS A SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION CONSISTING OF 3 AND 16 SF BRIGADES AND 26 MARINE BRIGADE.
 - B. ONLY 16 SF BRIGADE WAS OBSERVED ON THE MOVE PRIOR TO INVASION AND IT IS NOT CONFIRMED THAT ALL THIS DIVISION TOOK PART.
- REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS.
10. (S) SADDAM HUSSEINS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED THE VALIDITY OF THE 1975 ALGIERS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY OF ALL MUSLIMS HAS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONFRONTATION IN KUWAIT.
11. (S) SADDAM MAY NOW HOPE TO RELEASE A NUMBER OF DIVISIONS FROM THE IRANIAN BORDER FOR USE ON OTHER FRONTS. HE HAS NO FORMATIONS IN THE WEST OF IRAQ FACING SYRIA AND MAY NEED MORE TROOPS TO REINFORCE HIS NORTHERN BORDER WITH TURKEY. HE WILL CERTAINLY TEND TO CONCENTRATE A RESERVE FORCE SOMEWHERE IN CENTRAL IRAQ, EVEN IF ONLY FOR DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE READY DIVISIONS ARE MOSTLY INFANTRY. ANY REDEPLOYMENT

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WILL PROBABLY GO SLOWLY, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE RESOURCES INVOLVED BUT ALSO BECAUSE IRAQ WILL LOOK FOR SIGNS OF MATCHING IRANIAN ACTION. 12. (S) NOR IS IT CLEAR HOW MANY DIVISIONS MAY BE AT HIS DISPOSAL. THE COST OF MOBILISING THE EXTRA DIVISIONS ANNOUNCED AFTER THE INVASION OF KUWAIT MAY HAVE PROVEN TO BE TOO GREAT IN ECONOMIC TERMS, MANY OF THE SKILLED MEN MAY PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN THE ECONOMY AND CANNOT BE SPARED. THE FLESHING OUT OF DIVISIONS THAT HAD BEEN PARTLY DEMOBILISED ANNOUNCED AT THE SAME TIME MAY ALSO HAVE MADE HEAVY DEMANDS ON MANPOWER.

13. (S) OVERALL WHILE THESE TROOPS COULD GIVE SADDAM MORE DEFENSIVE UNITS THEY WILL NOT NECESSARILY AFFECT THE SITUATION IN KUWAIT IN THE SHORT OR MEDIUM TERM.

14. (S) OMANS CONTRIBUTION TO THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL PENINSULA SHIELD FORCE WILL BE A BATTALION GROUP OF 1175 MEN TO INCLUDE A BATTERY OF 105MM AND JAVELIN SAM.

15. (S) QATAR HAS COMPLAINED IN FORTHRIGHT TERMS TO IRAQ AT THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPAGANDA TO IRAQIS RESIDENT IN THAT STATE. ASSESSMENT.

16. (S) IRAQ HAS NOW RENOUNCED THE GAINS WHICH IT OBTAINED FROM 8 LONG YEARS OF WAR WITH IRAN. THIS MAKES IT THE MORE IMPORTANT TO ENSURE ADVANTAGE FROM THE INVASION OF KUWAIT. SADDAM HUSSEIN CONTINUES TO SEEK TO MOBILISE ARAB SUPPORT FOR A PURPORTED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WHILE STRENGTHENING DEFENCES IN KUWAIT.

17. (S) WE HAVE STILL TO OBSERVE THE SORT OF REINFORCEMENT OF THE IRAQI INVASION FORCE IN KUWAIT WHICH WOULD ALLOW IT TO GO ON TO THE OFFENSIVE INTO SAUDI ARABIAN TERRITORY ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE BUILD UP OF AMERICAN AND OTHER FOREIGN FORCES. WE THEREFORE ASSESS THAT OFFENSIVE ACTION IS UNLIKELY IN THE SHORT TERM

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LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 August 1990

IRAQ/KUWAIT

At his request Sir Jeffrey Sterling and Raphael Rikanate called into see me this afternoon. Rikanate is Chairman of OSG which has strong banking and shipping interests in Israel (it is claimed to be the largest private sector company in Israel). He said that both public and political opinion in Israel was very fearful that Saddam Hussain would embark on another "mad" military venture within the next few weeks. They doubted that he would simply sit tight and use the weapons of western hostages/Arab rhetoric and terrorist attack to contain the situation (from his point of view).

There was strong public support for the Israeli government's low profile approach to the Gulf crisis. Everybody recognised that that was in Israel's best interest. Israel had said publicly that if Iraq invaded Jordan they would have become involved, but in no other circumstance. The Israelis recognised that even if there were Iraqi inspired terrorist attacks, immediate retaliation would be counter productive. The mood in Israel had become calmer over the last few days since the impression had got about that Iraq did not have long range missiles capable of delivering biological or chemical warheads. Conventional long range missiles the Israelis could live with and the Israeli air force would be able to deal with the rest.

The mood in the occupied territories was surprisingly quiet. There was of course a lot of pro-Saddam feeling among the Palestinians but that had not so far turned into demonstrations. Rikanate thought that, provided Saddam did not engage in further military ventures, sanctions would work and could be made to stick. The key was Aqaba. Trade through there was very slow but he for one had been surprised at the apparent readiness of King Hussein to apply sanctions on cargoes trying to come through Aqaba. They had expected the Jordanians to play for an American

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- 2 -

blockade. The feeling in Israel was that King Hussein was a clever operator who would survive. The fact that Syria had come out against Iraq had actually strengthened Hussein's position considerably: it enabled him to begin to move away from the overtly pro-Iraqi stance without sacrificing the respect of his subjects.

DOMINIC MORRIS

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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1990-08-17 13:43

P.02

AUG 17 '90 14:38 FROM NUMBER 10

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uk

PM/90/057PRIME MINISTERIran

1. Following Charles Powell's letter of 12 August to William Waldegrave's Private Secretary, I am writing to let you know of the action we are taking to establish early contacts with the Iranians.
2. I have instructed Sir Crispin Tickell to propose to his Iranian opposite number a meeting of officials from London and Tehran in Geneva at the end of next week. The British official will be briefed to go with a broad agenda. The aim will be to demonstrate UK interest in early resumption of relations, and to explore the scope for resolving the outstanding issues of Rushdie, Cooper and the hostages. We should not give the impression that all three are absolute pre-conditions for resumption.
3. We shall take stock following this first meeting in Geneva. I would like to return to the question of relations with Syria after my forthcoming visit to the area.

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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PM/90/057PRIME MINISTERIran

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DH

(DOUGLAS HURD)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
17 August 1990

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TELEPHONE: 0753 830707
FAX: 0753 830788

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
17 August, 1990.
JMG/JMM/193.

Charles Powell, Esq.,
10 Downing Street,
LONDON SW1A 2AA.

Dear Charles,

Herewith an interesting article along the lines of one of my notes.

As ever.


JP, James Goldsmith.

(Dictated by Sir James over the telephone and signed in his absence.)

What's the Soviet game in the Gulf?

VIRTUAL ALLY

By Edward Jay Epstein

The Soviet Union is America's "virtual ally" in the Iraqi confrontation, according to *The New York Times*. News Quiz:

A virtual ally is one that:

- A) Gives good joint communiqués condemning Iraq.
- B) Provides Iraq with more than 8,000 military advisers and other specialists—and does not withdraw them even after condemning its invasion of Kuwait.
- C) Sells Iraq the helicopters, landing craft, surface-to-air missiles, T-72 tanks, night-fighting equipment, and spare parts it needed for its blitzkrieg of Kuwait.
- D) Votes in support of the United States in the U.N. Security Council for an embargo that will cause the price of oil to skyrocket.
- E) Fails to join the U.S. blockade of Iraq on grounds it has not been legally authorized by the U.N.
- F) Maintains its friendship treaty alliance with Iraq even after its invasion.
- G) Supplies Iraq over the past year with advanced MiG-29 fighters with extended range kits and surface-to-surface missiles that now threaten Saudi Arabia.
- H) Trains Iraq's general staff officers and helped organize its intelligence service over the past three decades.
- I) Hosts a fishing vacation in Siberia for the U.S. Secretary of State at the height of the crisis.

The answer, of course, is: all of the above. These actions may seem confusing if not inconsistent, if it is assumed that the Soviet Union has a common interest with the United States in maintaining the peace and

stability of the Persian Gulf and its oil production. But is that the case? Even in the glasnostized world of joint communiqués and fishing vacations, the United States and the USSR have sharply different interests in the Persian Gulf.

First, the United States is the world's largest importer of energy and the Soviet Union is the world's largest exporter, which means that when there is chaos in the Persian Gulf, and the price ratchets up, it is the United States' loss and the Soviet Union's gain. The United States imports an average of about 7 million barrels of oil a day, which means that each dollar increase drains more than \$2 billion a year from the U.S. economy (while higher fuel prices divert resources from other, more productive, activities). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, exports 3.3 million barrels of crude oil a day (about the same as Saudi Arabia) and, in addition, sells Europe almost an equivalent amount of natural gas, the price of which is contractually tied to the price of a barrel of oil. So each dollar rise generated by Persian Gulf tensions adds nearly \$2 billion a year to the foreign earnings of the Soviet Union. Energy already provides the USSR with 70 percent to 80 percent of its hard currency earnings. If the price of oil were driven up to \$40 a barrel, as it was in Iraq's prior war in the Gulf in 1980, the Soviet Union could expect to increase its hard currency earnings by nearly \$40 billion a year, not to mention the increased earnings its gold, silver, and diamond exports would bring in (precious metals go up in a crisis—gold has already risen \$50 an ounce—and the Soviet Union is the world's second-largest producer of gold, after South Africa). This would go a long way to ameliorating its economic problems. On the other hand, such a price increase would undoubtedly plunge the United States into a depression.

Second, tension in the Persian Gulf benefits Soviet arms sales. The Soviet Union is the primary arms supplier to all the radical states—Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iran. With war in the Gulf, and an American blockade, these countries can be expected to buy more Soviet planes, missiles, and radar, either to protect themselves from Iraq or to counter the American intervention. This means more Soviet advisers, more training facilities, and more revenues. Much of the money for Syrian arms comes from Saudi Arabia, which pays the Soviet Union for most arms purchases by loading Saudi oil onto Soviet tankers—a quasi-blackmail arrangement worked out after Carlos the Terrorist (who was protected by the Soviet intelligence services and operated from Hungary) kidnapped Sheikh Yamani and other OPEC ministers from a Vienna meeting in 1973. (In order to get its oil minister back, Saudi Arabia became amenable to financing less well-endowed Arab regimes.) Iran, which is now modernizing with Soviet equipment, and Libya also pay with oil. In all, the Soviets now get a half million barrels a day for their arms, and this will increase. The Soviets, despite their new status as virtual allies, ship

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part of the Arab oil to Cuba to help subsidize its activities in Latin America.

Third, the more risky Persian Gulf oil becomes, the more attractive Soviet gas becomes. Soviet natural gas is an alternative to Persian Gulf crude for both Europe and Japan. The Soviet Union already is delivering some 40 billion cubic meters of gas a year to Europe from its Ural and Siberian fields (as well as from Iran and Afghanistan). It has also been quietly negotiating a deal under which Japan would develop gas fields in eastern Siberia and build a pipeline across the Sakalin peninsula to the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. If the crisis goes on for a year or so, Japan reasonably can be expected to sign up for Soviet gas.

Unlike the United States, then, the Soviet Union gains from an extended embargo in the Persian Gulf. The hotter the crisis, the better. It loses only if Iraq gives up, or is otherwise defeated.

The odd part of this virtual alliance is not merely the conflict of interest but the unwillingness of the United States to ask the sort of questions it would have asked in the pre-glasnost era if a Soviet military client, with a friendship treaty, invaded a U.S. ally. According to one Pentagon source, the United States had not even determined the role or number of Soviet technicians advising the Iraq army. All that the Soviets will say officially is, "I think the advice to Iraq to attack Kuwait did not come from our advisers." This still leaves open such questions as:

1) Did the USSR have advance knowledge of well-designed Iraqi plans to invade Kuwait? After all, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had military advisers in Iraq attached to the helicopter, tank, logistic, and radar units used for the invasion, and the KGB presumably had developed sources from the three generations of Iraqi staff and planning officers trained by Moscow.

2) What was the mission of Colonel General Albert Makashov, the former commander of Volga-Urals Command, to Baghdad as Soviet military counselor two weeks prior to the invasion?

3) How could Iraq be sure that Syria would not take advantage of its confrontation with the United States, unless it had made some arrangement with Syria in advance? If so, did the Soviets act as the intermediary?

4) Is the Soviet Union going to use its position on the U.N. Security Council to call for a non-military solution—i.e., an embargo but not air or naval actions—which will lead to a prolonged stalemate?

5) How are the Soviets able to make arrangements for Soviet citizens to leave Iraq, and why are there no Soviet hostages?

If it turns out the Soviet Union is pursuing its own interest in the Persian Gulf, the result could be an endless crisis and zooming oil prices. With a virtual ally like that, who needs enemies?

EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN is the author of *Deception: The Invisible Wall Between the KGB and the CIA* (Simon and Schuster).



DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>PREM 19</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM <i>3076</i> (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Tel Aviv telegram no. 277 to FCO dated 17 August 1990</i>	
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Extract details: <i>Extract Unnumbered telegram</i> <i>712 Aviv to FCO</i> <i>17/8/90</i>	
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KISSINGER ASSOC.

P.002

charles ②

HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 17, 1990

received by me
roddy

Dear Mr. Powell:

Pursuant to our conversation last weekend,
I am sending you a galley proof of my
article on the subject. It will appear
next week in the Washington Post and
other papers but I wanted you to have
it now as you might want to bring this
to the attention of the Prime Minister
before it appears in print.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Charles Powell
10 Downing Street
London

Letter dictated but not read by Mr.
Kissinger from Kent, Connecticut

Prime Minister

A convincing
piece, although
no discussion of
the 'hostage'

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR - 350 PARK AVENUE - NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 - (212) 759-7919

problem. See in
particular page 9,
which is what he said
to me. CDP
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AUG. 17 '90 09:32 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

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The crisis over Kuwait marks a watershed for the Bush Administration. Success will boost world morale and the world economy as well as strengthen the President's domestic leadership. Failure will blight all subsequent efforts, domestic as well as international.

So far the Administration has risen to the challenge with subtlety, skill and fortitude. But the game has only begun. The President's dramatic decision to deploy a major military force in Saudi Arabia has raised not only the prospects of success but also the stakes of defeat. The United States has in fact passed the point of no return.

It therefore becomes crucial to assess properly how success and failure are to be defined. The UN Security Council has unanimously demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the restoration of the legitimate government. The United States has justified its interdiction of the sealanes as a response to a request of the expelled Kuwaiti government.

In these circumstances, should Iraq manage to remain in Kuwait or exercise indirect control through some puppet, the American show of force will turn into a debacle. If in the end Iraq controls Kuwait and U.S. forces stay in Saudi Arabia, the crisis will have ended in a demonstration of the irrelevance of America and of world opinion. In any event, neither Arab nor American politics would long sustain significant troop deployments in Saudi Arabia. The argument that we have saved Saudi Arabia will be overwhelmed by the perception of an

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American failure that would shake political, economic, and financial stability everywhere. Indeed, even attainment of the U.N. objectives might provide only a breathing space if Saddam Hussein remains in office and Iraq continues to build up its nuclear and chemical weapons potential.

Time is not on our side. American staying power in the face of public, regional and allied pressures is usually inversely proportional to the scale of our deployment. Thus, if after a certain interval the conflict appears to settle down to a siege, the United States will be obliged to consider new measures to bring it to a conclusion.

There is little debate about the significance of Hussein's actions. Without provocation or warning, Iraq overwhelmed Kuwait, whose national existence is as old as Iraq's, and overthrew the dynasty that had governed there for 250 years. Moreover, this naked aggression was justified in a manner that challenges the very political structure of the Middle East. For Saddam Hussein argued that all the frontiers of the region were artificially drawn to divide the Arab nation and that the time had come for the rulers in Baghdad to erase these frontiers and to achieve Arab unity through force of arms. Success for Iraq in Kuwait would usher in a series of upheavals certain to culminate in a general Middle East war.

A government as cautious and as dedicated to anonymity as Saudi Arabia's would never have asked for the assistance of foreign troops had it not considered the very survival of the state at stake. Nor would the Arab summit have condemned a

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brother country. Nor would Egypt, Syria and Morocco have sent troops to assist Saudi Arabia. Likewise, in the developing world, where so many countries have more precarious and even more recent frontiers as well as covetous neighbors, a victory by Iraq could inaugurate a time of troubles.

The vital interests of the industrial states are affected most directly. If Iraq succeeds in making the annexation of Kuwait stick, it could determine the price of oil by black-mailing the states of the Arabian peninsula which together with Kuwait and Iraq control ^{more than} ~~some~~ 40% of the world's oil reserves ~~into~~ reducing their oil production. The result would be to destroy the already tenuous balance between supply and demand and drive up the price of oil which would lead to world-wide recession, unemployment and inflation.

This would explain the extraordinary unanimity of the world's condemnation of Iraq, enlisting even the Soviet Union now going through its crisis of communism. into which the crisis of communism has enlisted even the Soviet Union.

The United States had three choices in dealing with the crisis: it could passively endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it could support whatever the industrial democracies all of which are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is were prepared to do in concert; or, it could take the lead in opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal burden.

There were ample excuses for avoiding a decision. The most.

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fashionable is the argument that the defense of the area should be an Arab matter. But in the end, alibis can not change the consequences of failure to resist. None of the Arab states are strong enough even in combination to defeat the Iraqi army, toughened in a 10-year war, supplied with advanced military technology during that time by the Soviet Union and France and buttressed by economic assistance from the other industrial democracies, including the United States. Such an argument marks the reemergence of American isolationism, especially among the conservatives. Allowed to prevail, it would and it must conclude with America's abdication at the very moment when the old East-West conflict has been won.

Another argument to avoid a U.S. role is that even if Iraq controlled all the oil in the Gulf, it would still have to sell it in a world market governed by the laws of supply and demand. But were Iraq to achieve its strategic design, it would be able to determine the level of supply by taking production away from sparsely populated principalities in the Arabian peninsula without hurting its own population. The ability to cause a world-wide economic crisis is not the sort of power to be left in the hands of a ruler who has attacked two of his six neighbors, is engaged in mortal conflict with two others, and has used poison gas against his own dissident population.

The Administration must have concluded that the first two options would almost certainly have ended with making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent. That would produce the

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collapse of the moderate governments in the region including Egypt. Ultimately, a general Middle East war would have been probable; the immediate crisis would have been ducked by making a later catastrophe inevitable.

Having committed the United States to a leadership role, President Bush made another crucial decision. The American military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President Bush and his advisors opted for a massive deployment. They seem to have reasoned that the U.N.'s unexpected sanction might change Saddam Hussein's calculation. He may well not have originally intended to seize the Saudi oil fields. Had there been no meaningful resistance, he would not have needed to do so. The rulers of the Arabian peninsula in Saudi Arabia as well as in the Emirates would have yielded to Iraqi pressures or been overthrown, more likely both.

But once the sanctions were voted, Saddam Hussein's calculus was bound to change. So long as oil prices remain steady, the sanctions are likely to be sustained for many months. And prices ^{Edgar} will remain at more or less present levels if Saudi Arabia increases its production by 2.5 million barrels. The remaining ~~1.6 million barrels of the 4.1 million~~ barrel present shortfall (at least until the winter) caused by the loss of oil from Iraq and Kuwait, can be pieced together (at least until the winter) from Venezuela, the Emirates,

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Nigeria and other small producers. But if Saudi production ^{do not} ~~can~~ ~~be destroyed or even severely~~ reduced, the absence of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil ^{would} ~~will~~ lead to an explosive rise in oil prices. With ~~Saudi production crippled and~~ a world wide depression looming, it would become increasingly difficult to maintain sanctions; Saddam Hussein would win the endurance contest.

President Bush and his advisors must have concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if necessary.

There is now widespread public support; the United Nations is nearly unanimous; NATO countries have sent naval and air contingents; an Arab multinational force is in place. The test, however, will not be the extent of the support but its durability. For that reason, this is a time for ~~At the same~~ time, the Administration needs to calculate very carefully the window of opportunity it has available to achieve its objectives.

The Administration must take care not to wallow in the wide domestic and international support it now enjoys. For the perfectly legitimate concern about the probability of success expressed by talk show hosts and newspaper columnists coupled with insistent reassurances by Administration spokesmen will over time weaken the credibility of the American enterprise. The longer it lasts the more American governmental procedures and Congressional inquiries will take their toll. At some

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point the familiar question of the light at the end of the tunnel is bound to surface.

The situation within the Middle East is also likely to grow more precarious the longer the crisis festers. The impact on the Arab world of anti-Western propaganda from Baghdad and the skillful linking of the issues of Kuwait and of Palestine must not be underestimated. The region is now polarized as never before and radicalism is on the rise. A coup in one of the Emirates or sabotage in the oil fields would send another shock through the region. It would upset the already precarious balance between supply and demand in the world oil markets, driving up oil prices, causing unemployment and inflation, and risking the solidarity backing the sanctions. The refusal of France to permit its navy to participate in the sea interdiction may be a foretaste.

Time is therefore of the essence. The time required for the sanctions to work must be balanced against the factors undermining international cohesion. Such an analysis must keep in mind that the acid test of the sanctions will be not how much oil is prevented from leaving the region but how few supplies are allowed to enter Iraq. Iraqi oil exports are relatively easily blocked. But Iraq's frontiers are long and less bulky goods such as food can seep in. And the likelihood of this happening will grow the longer the crisis lasts and the more Iraq's neighbors conclude that they may have to live with the Iraqi dictator, however dangerous he may be.

A sharp and short crisis is far more in the interest of all

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concerned with moderation than a long siege. I am not in a position to know whether sanctions can work within the time constraints outlined here. I also realize that the United States must consider the risk that a more aggressive course might take away some of the current international support. As things stand, that support would not survive the appearance of an American defeat. The United States stands to lose the most from a long siege whatever the relative immediate economic impact on Europe and Japan. An ignominious withdrawal following the debacle in Lebanon and any withdrawal however dressed up without achieving our objectives would be ignominious would end America's stabilizing role in the Middle East. And no other country could take its place. It would also undermine the single most important asset left in America's relations with Europe and Japan America's contribution to the security of its allies. It would gravely weaken the Bush Administration's capacity to overcome the economic crisis that would inevitably follow.

It would be a mistake to focus only on America's difficulties. In the end, Iraq is a heavily indebted developing country with a population of only 16 million that has just ended a debilitating ten-year war with Iran, and which has hostile relations with four of its six neighbors. It is in no position to enter into a protracted conflict with the United States. Saddam Hussein proved during the Iran war that he is prepared to negotiate when necessary. His most recent offer agreed to the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait,

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
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albeit under outrageous conditions. It may be the beginning of an attempt at negotiation obscured by bluster once the reality of the stark choices before Iraq sinks in. Then the offer to withdraw may reemerge stripped of its absurd baggage.

X But the United States cannot afford to be diddled and it simply cannot afford to lose. If it should be concluded that sanctions are too uncertain and diplomacy unavailing, the United States will need to consider a surgical and progressive destruction of Iraq's military assets especially since an outcome that leaves Saddam Hussein in place and his military machine unimpaired might turn out to be only an interlude between aggressions.

It would be irresponsible for an outsider to press for a course of action in a situation so dependent on information not available to the kibitzer. But it is important to understand that America has crossed its Rubicon. All those concerned with global peace and world economic well being should subordinate whatever tactical misgivings they may have to standing behind the only policy that can now succeed.

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Extract details: <i>Telegram (unnumbered) from Tel Aviv to MADUK dated 17 August 1990</i>	
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CONFIDENTIALPRIME MINISTERIRAQ/KUWAIT

Just a few points of interest from this morning's telegrams.

President Bush/King Hussein

I attach the full reporting telegram from the FCO of that meeting. It adds little to the read-out I gave you last night but it is interesting that President Bush thought it worth while debriefing President Mubarak straight after that meeting.

UK Residents in Kuwait

The cloud is still there, but less menacing than it was yesterday. Our Embassy and the US have put out broadcasts cancelling yesterday's advice and are now advising the community to stay at home. It is clear from Iraqi meetings with the diplomatic corps in Kuwait that they are trying to drive a wedge between the UK and US residents on one hand and those of the other Western powers on the other. My assessment, with which Robin Butler agrees, is that the Iraqis still plan to use the bargaining lever which the foreign residents provide but do not yet have a clear plan about how to use it. Yesterday's move probably reflected instructions from Baghdad but the Iraqis found it administratively impossible to carry those instructions out on the ground.

Action in the UN

US State Department have urged caution about an emergency Security Council meeting on evacuation of foreign residents. Their fear is that some UN delegations will be unsound and that a resolution could in any case be counter productive with Saddam Hussein. We are continuing to press the UN Secretary General to do what he can with the Iraqis but indications are that the Iraqis have already rejected the idea of a personal emissary from Perez de Cuellar. FCO are continuing informal consultations about the possibility of a UN convoy to evacuate all foreign nationals.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

De Cuellar has issued helpful clarification of his earlier remarks on the use of Article 51 to enforce sanctions. In brief, what he now says is, provided the use of the word "blockade" is avoided, the action being taken is legal.



DOMINIC MORRIS

17 August 1990

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AUG 17 '90 12:09 FROM NUMBER 10

PAGE.002

CONFIDENTIALPRIME MINISTERIRAQ/KUWAIT

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- 2 -

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DOMINIC MORRIS

17 August 1990

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ADVANCE COPY

SIC

PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN: 16 AUGUST
SUMMARY

1. INITIAL ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT THE AMERICANS ARE ENCOURAGED BY HUSSEIN'S PERFORMANCE; HE DID NOT ATTEMPT A MEDIATION ROLE AND PROVIDED ASSURANCES ON SANCTIONS. DIFFERENCES REMAIN BUT RELATIONS PARTLY REPAIRED. DETAILED ACCOUNT PROMISED FROM GATES.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, WELL BEYOND THE ALLOTTED TIME, WITH BUSH EXTENDING THE DISCUSSION BY ACCOMPANYING HUSSEIN ONTO THE PLANE WHICH TOOK HIM FROM KENNEBUNKPORT. AS A RESULT, BUSH AND HIS ENTOURAGE WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER AND WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ONLY A BRIEF READOUT SO FAR. THE NSC HAVE TOLD US THAT A FURTHER ACCOUNT WILL BE PROVIDED BY GATES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHO IS LIKELY TO CONTACT LONDON DIRECT. MEANWHILE THE FOLLOWING COMES FROM WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC.

3. WELCH SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO ALL THE SPECULATION BEFOREHAND, HUSSEIN BROUGHT NO HIDDEN AGENDA, NO NEWS OF SECRET MEETINGS, SPECIAL REQUESTS OR MESSAGES FROM SADDAM. (BUSH HAS NOW CONFIRMED AS MUCH IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE: QUOTE THERE WAS NO INTERMEDIARY MISSION THAT I DETECTED AT ALL UNQUOTE.)

4. WELCH CHARACTERISED THIS MEETING AS BEING PRIMARILY ABOUT REPAIRING US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS, AND GETTING HUSSEIN SUFFICIENTLY BACK ON SIDE RATHER THAN A MEANS OF EXPLORING POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. TO THAT EXTENT IT HAD BEEN A MODEST SUCCESS. THE TWO MEN HAD GOT ON WELL TOGETHER AND THE MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A BASICALLY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. HUSSEIN HAD BEEN NOTABLY AT EASE SUBSEQUENTLY DURING HIS OWN PRESS CONFERENCE WHEN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, AS DISTINCT FROM EVIDENT ANXIETY WHEN

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QUESTIONED OVER SUBSTANCE. SIMILARLY BUSH HAD PUT A POSITIVE COMPLEXION ON THE EVENT IN HIS OWN REMARKS TO THE PRESS: QUOTE WE'VE HAD SOME GOOD MEETINGS HERE TODAY ... I THINK HE'D LIKE TO FIND SOME WAY TO BE HELPFUL ... I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM THAT IN SPITE OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT MAY HAVE APPEARED TO BE GRIEVOUS A WEEK OR SO AGO, THAT ON THE PART OF THIS PRESIDENT, AND I THINK OF THE UNITED STATES ENTIRELY, WE'D LIKE TO SEE BETTER RELATIONS UNQUOTE.

5. WELCH SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE MAINLY BECAUSE HUSSEIN HAD TAKEN A GENERALLY ENCOURAGING LINE ON SANCTIONS INCLUDING ON SHIPMENTS THROUGH AQABA. HE SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS (THERE IS SOME DOUBT IN THE NSC AT THIS STAGE WHETHER HE ACTUALLY SAID QUOTE WAS COMPLYING UNQUOTE). AS WAS CLEAR FROM HUSSEIN'S PUBLIC REMARKS, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT THE SANCTIONS COVERED, WHETHER HUMANITARIAN FOODSTUFFS WERE EXEMPT AND AT WHAT POINT SUCH EXEMPTION APPLIED. BUT WELCH ARGUED THAT SOME OTHER GOVERNMENTS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE AND WERE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE UN. IT COULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS AN ENTIRELY DISINGENUOUS POINT. HE THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT BUSH WOULD PORTRAY THE DISCUSSION ON SANCTIONS AS PROVIDING THE ASSURANCES THE AMERICANS REQUIRED (AS INDEED HAS BEEN THE CASE).

6. THAT SAID, THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED US OBJECTIVES AND HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE THEM THROUGH. HUSSEIN HAD NOT DISGUISED HIS VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DONE THE WRONG THING, THAT ARAB OPINION WAS AGAINST THEM AND THAT AN ARAB SOLUTION WAS THE RIGHT WAY OUT. HUSSEIN WAS DEEPLY WORRIED. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURSE HE HAD CHOSEN. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD LOST ALL CONFIDENCE IN ANYTHING SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT SAY.

7. AFTER THE MEETING WITH HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDI, WE UNDERSTAND THAT BUSH IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED PRESIDENT MUBARAK. INDEED THE ABOVE ACCOUNT WAS BASED MAINLY ON BUSH'S REMARKS TO MUBARAK, WHICH WELCH (PLEASE PROTECT) HAD MONITORED AS NOTETAKER.

8. FULL TEXT OF BUSH'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

YYYY

PAGE 2
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Roger Freeman Esq MP
Minister of State
Department of Transport
2 Marsham Street
London

Foreign and Comm

London SW

17 August

BCC

Float
SCD

Prime Minister

Tom King MP

John Major MP

John Wakeham MP

David Waddington MP

Peter Lilley MP

Sir Patrick Mayhew

Sir Robin Butler

Dear Roger,

AVIATION SECURITY *flap*

William Waldegrave has asked me to reply to your letter of 14 August. Clearly the whole question of the security of British shipping and airline activity in the region of the Gulf needs to be kept under close review. So do the security arrangements for our airlines' operations elsewhere given the enhanced threat from terrorist activity. I know that our respective officials have been in close touch, particularly to ensure that other countries take their responsibilities towards aviation security as seriously as the current situation warrants. I note that procedures for identification of aircraft in the vicinity of naval ships in the Gulf have been reissued, but hope that air traffic control authorities are routing civil aircraft well away from the danger zones.

While our Emergency Unit and the Transport Co-ordination Centre are open to deal with the current crisis I am confident that the short term arrangements for preventing civil aircraft from flying into war zones will operate effectively. But we do need to establish longer term procedures with your National Air Traffic Control Services to prevent a repetition of BA 149's misfortune. I have instructed staff here to look at this problem urgently with your officials.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Tom King, John Major, John Wakeham, David Waddington, Peter Lilley, Sir Patrick Mayhew and Sir Robin Butler.

John Gaver
Mark

Mark Lennox-Boyd

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE
CONFIDENTIAL

10 DOWNING STREET

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

17 August 1990

Iraq/Kuwait: President Bush's Meeting with
King Hussein and Prince Saud

Robert Gates telephoned me at midnight last night to give a quick read-out on the meeting which the President had had that day. He was unable to give a full read-out since much of the session with King Hussein had been restricted to the principals plus single note-taker. (Much of the ground is covered in similar terms in the report and telegram from Washington.)

The King had spent much of the meeting going over the role that Jordan had sought to play in securing an Arab solution and the difficulties that situation caused for Jordan. He made clear that he had no message or letter from Saddam Hussein and was not trying to act as an intermediary. He said that he had given direction for compliance with the UN resolution on sanctions. His people were seeking legal clarification from the UN about the full extent of the resolution. They were in particular exploring two issues: how far the humanitarian exception applied to foodstuffs, and whether, if Iraqi debt to Jordan was repaid in oil and the Iraqis were not getting any new money for it, did that fall in the sanctions resolution. The King said that Aqaba was not a problem. Through trade had in any case slowed to a trickle and goods which would be in breach of the sanctions resolution would not be allowed through. Gates commented that this was particularly welcome news for the Americans, who were very wary about the difficulties for them of enforcing sanctions off Aqaba.

There was some non-specific discussion of economic assistance for Jordan. The President expressed a general willingness to work with other countries to help Jordan, recognising that they had special problems, but Jordan needed to be seen to be implementing effectively the UN resolutions. The tone of the meeting and the lunch thawed considerably. Gates's only other comment was that while in terms of substance it had not been worth three hours, overall the Americans thought the time had been well spent in re-establishing good relations with Jordan and helping to bring King Hussein back on side.

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- 2 -

The President went almost immediately into a meeting with Prince Saud. Again, there was limited discussion of substance. The Prince was full of Saudi gratitude for the action which the Americans and others had taken. There was a discussion on the US/Saudi framework agreement on military forces which for obvious reasons Gates did not want to go into over an open line. He commented that Prince Saud had been very up-beat. The Prince was highly optimistic that, provided the international community continued to work effectively, the sanctions would bite and would achieve the desired results. The Saudis were already getting reports of dissidence within Iraq. The Prince thought that these reports were genuine and that disaffection with Saddam would grow quite rapidly in the coming weeks. Saddam's greatest asset might be his massive military forces; they also posed the greatest threat to him.

A copy of this letter goes to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence).

DOMINIC MORRIS

S. L. Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
FM EAST BERLIN
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 492
OF 161530Z AUGUST 90
INFO PRIORITY DTZ (BYRANT DTZ), DM BERLIN, BONN

Prime Minister

X is a small piece of good
news. Your letter to de Maiziere
was clearly worthwhile

Jm

YOUR TELNO 196: GDR CEMENT WORKS

1. FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE OF 24 JULY TO
DE MAIZIERE ABOUT RMC'S EFFORTS TO BUY THE RUEDERSDORF CEMENT
WORKS WE HAVE FOLLOWED UP REPEATEDLY WITH THE TREUHANDANSTALT.
WE HEARD THIS MORNING FROM THEM THAT RMC HAD COME OUT TOP IN A
COMPETITION AGAINST SEVERAL OTHER BIDDERS. RMC'S LAWYERS CONFIRM
THE NEWS: THEY SAY THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE VERY SOON
(AND ASK THAT THE NEWS SHOULD BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL
ANNOUNCED). RMC WERE EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S
INTERVENTION.

2. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER WHEN WE HEAR DIRECTLY FROM RMC.

3. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT I HAVE HAD A LETTER FROM
MR PETER WALKER MP ON BEHALF OF BRITISH GAS TO COMPLAIN THAT THEY
SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SHUT OUT OF THE COMPETITION TO ACQUIRE A
GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY (VERBUNDNETZGAS) IN THE GDR, VALUED AT
OVER POUNDS 350 MILLION AND ASKING IF I CAN HELP IN ANY WAY.
BRITISH GAS FEAR THAT A CONSORTIUM FROM THE FRG LED BY RUHRGAS
HAS BEEN ALLOWED IN THROUGH THE BACK DOOR. THEY HAVE WRITTEN
IN STRONG TERMS TO GOHLKE AT THE TREUHANDANSTALT. I PROPOSE TO
TELL THE TREUHANDANSTALT THAT WE REGARD THESE MATTERS AS
COMMERCIAL ONES WHICH SHOULD BE DECIDED ON COMMERCIAL GROUNDS.
AT THE SAME TIME WE BELIEVE IT TO BE IN THE GDR'S INTEREST, AND
CONSISTENT WITH OUR PRINCIPLES THAT AS MANY COMPANIES AS POSSIBLE
SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMPETE ON EQUAL TERMS. THAT WAS WHAT THE
TREUHANDANSTALT DECIDED TO INSIST ON OVER RUEDERSDORF AND IT SHOULD
DO THE SAME IN THIS CASE. ANY OTHER APPROACH WILL NOT BE UNDERSTOOD
BY THE UK.

EYERS

YYYY

PAGE 1

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UNCLASSIFIED COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

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UNCLASSIFIED
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EYERS

YYYY

PAGE 1

UNCLASSIFIED COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

P.02

1990-08-17 09:45

PRIME MINISTER

1. Dominic has spoken to Bob Gates and has been promised a report of the Hussein/Bush meeting as soon as possible. Hussein is seeing Prince Saud straight after Bush. The report should be ready about 10 pm tonight.
2. // Bob Gates was quite receptive to the suggestion of a UN plane or convoy to get western citizens out. There would need to be a Special Session of the Security Council to back it.
- || 3. The Special Session of the Security Council in New York is likely to produce the right results.

Mohica

16/8

CNN. - Impractical to comply. -
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csc

FROM: CHIEF SECRETARY
DATE: 16 August 1990

PRIME MINISTER

THE GULF CRISIS: JORDAN

The FCO have sent me an advance copy of the paper which William Waldegrave is submitting to you tonight about Jordan.

2. I recognise the importance of keeping the King's support for the sanctions policy. I recognise, too, the damage which this is likely to do to his already-precarious economy. It is not clear that such assistance will be enough to win his support. But I agree that we have little option but to try.

3. However, the costs must be kept within bounds. First, we need to distinguish between Jordan's financial position before the crisis (very largely the result of mismanagement and failure to agree an earlier programme with the IMF, or keep it on track once it was agreed) and the additional costs imposed by the sanctions policy. Our help should be confined to the latter; at a later stage, it will be necessary, in conjunction with the IMF and the IBRD, to tackle the underlying economic mess. We should also distinguish, as the paper does, between the gross costs of imposing sanctions, and the cost to Jordan of the crisis itself. (Many other countries are going to be damaged by the crisis; some, like Turkey and Egypt, by the imposition of sanctions).

4. Second, as the FCO paper proposes, we must do everything possible to broaden the base of such support. I entirely agree that we must look to the Japanese Government for a very large part of the cost, particularly given their inability to contribute to the military effort. We must also look to Saudi Arabia and, if possible, to the former Kuwaiti regime. The latter has very large

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assets in Britain, some part of which it should be persuaded to release for this purpose. Beyond the contributions from these sources the costs must be shared between the United States, the European Community (collectively or severally - I prefer the latter course) and the other major states involved in the imposition of sanctions.

5. I note that the FCO paper cannot, at this stage, put a figure on the costs. I suppose that, illustratively, they could easily fall in the range of £20 - £50 million for the UK. I do not for one moment suggest that these costs should not be incurred, if you judge that this is necessary in order to secure the King's support. But I shall be bound to seek offsetting savings, elsewhere in Douglas Hurd's programmes, and possibly by looking further afield. As John Major said at the initial Ministerial meeting about the crisis, its very nature makes it more, not less, necessary that we should continue with our own policies of restraint at home. And that must mean keeping public expenditure within its existing limits.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to William Waldegrave and to Sir Robin Butler.



NORMAN LAMONT
(Approved by the Chief Secretary and
signed in his absence)

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL NO. T1941/190



SUBJECT a matter
of

TRANSLATION

The Right Honourable Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
LONDON

I have received with thanks and appreciation your message of 9th August, 1990 in which you have kindly informed me of the position of the friendly Government of the United Kingdom and of the measures you intend to take in co-ordination with other states to ensure the effective implementation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions for enforcing total embargo on Iraq in order to put an end to its aggression against Kuwait, and to restore the complete sovereignty and independence of this sisterly country, as well as to contribute British forces to the multi-national effort for the collective defence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other threatened states of the Gulf.

In your letter you refer to the possibility of using the facilities at Doha from time to time, in addition to further assistance that might be required depending on the circumstances in the future. Undoubtedly, the State of Qatar which has supported resolutions taken in this regard by the U.N. Security Council, the Islamic Conference Organization, the Arab League, and the Cooperation council for Arab Gulf States, would welcome every constructive effort for the implementation of these resolutions and the assertion of international legitimacy as well as the enforcement of the unanimous will of the international community, as represented by these fora.

On the basis of the foregoing and on our awareness of our international obligations, and in particular those emanating from U.N. Security Council Resolution 661, and the U.N. Charter which asserts the right of individual and collective self-defence for member states, I hereby would like to inform you of our approval to grant the required facilities that may be needed due to the circumstances.

On the other hand, and in response to your request, I have already issued the necessary instructions to our Ministry of Interior to facilitate the departure of the British citizens until such a time when the present situation in the Gulf area gets back to normal.



- 2 -

I was pleased to receive in Doha today H.E. Alan Clark, British Minister of State for Defence Procurement at the Ministry of Defence, and exchange views with him on the current serious developments in the Gulf region, as well as our respective positions towards these developments. We have also discussed several other important matters. At my request Mr. Clark will kindly convey to you my views regarding these matters.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate our deep appreciation for the just and constructive position taken by the friendly government of the U.K. vis-a-vis this serious crisis, which does not only threaten the security and stability of the Gulf region, but also the security, peace and welfare of other peoples throughout the world.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my personal satisfaction for the growth and the enhancement of our distinct bilateral relations in various fields, due to the continued coordination and consultations between us in matters of mutual interest for our two friendly countries and peoples.

With my deep appreciation and high regards,

Yours Sincerely

*Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani
Amir and Prime Minister
of the State of Qatar*

*Diwan Amiri: Moharram 25, 1411 A.H.
corresponding to August 16, 1990.*

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ١ -

فخامة السيدة مارجريت تاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة.

تلقيت ببالغ الشكر والتقدير رسالتك المؤرخة ٩ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ التي حرصت فيها على احاطتي بموقف المملكة المتحدة الصديقة ، والتدابير التي تعتزم اتخاذها ، بالاشتراك مع دول أخرى ، لضمان تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي بفرض مقاطعة شاملة على العراق بغية إنهاء عدوانه على دولة الكويت واستعادة سيادة هذه الدولة الشقيقة واستقلالها كاملين ، وكذلك مشاركة القوات البريطانية في الجهد الدولي المشترك للدفاع الجماعي عن المملكة العربية السعودية والدول الأخرى المهددة في الخليج . وقد تطرقت فخامتكم في رسالتك الى ما قد يتطلبه ذلك من استخدام التسهيلات المتاحة في الدوحة من آن لآخر ،

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٢ -

بالإضافة الى أية مساعدات أخرى قد تقتضيها
الظروف مستقبلا.

ومما لا شك فيه أن دولة قطر التي
ساندت قرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي ، ومنظمة
المؤتمر الاسلامي ، وجامعة الدول العربية ،
ومجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية الصادرة في
هذا الصدد ، ترحب بكل جهد بناء يرمي الى
تنفيذ هذه القرارات ، وتأكيد الشرعية الدولية ،
ووضع الارادة الإجماعية للمجتمع الدولي ، متمثلة
في قرارات الهيئات المذكورة ، موضع التنفيذ .

وبناء على ما تقدم ، وادراكا من
دولة قطر لالتزاماتها الدولية ، وعلى الأخص تلك
المنبثقة عن قرار مجلس الأمن الدولي رقم ٦٦١
، وميثاق الأمم المتحدة الذي يؤكد حق الدول ،

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٣ -

فرادى وجماعات ، في الدفاع الشرعي عن النفس ،
فإننا نوافق على منح التسهيلات المطلوبة التي
قد تقتضيها الظروف مستقبلا .

من ناحية أخرى ، واستجابة لطلبكم ،
فقد أصدرت تعليماتي الى وزارة الداخلية
بالمعاونة في تسهيل مغادرة البلاد لمن يرغب
في ذلك من الرعايا البريطانيين الى أن تنجلي
الظروف الطارئة التي تحيط بمنطقة الخليج في
الوقت الراهن.

وقد أسعدني أن استقبل في الدوحة
صباح اليوم سعادة السيد ألن كلارك وزير الدولة
لشئون المشتريات الدفاعية ، وأن أتبادل معه
وجهات النظر حول الوضع الخطير القائم حاليا في

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

- ٤ -



منطقة الخليج وموقف حكومتينا ازائه. وقد
تناولت مباحثاتنا العديد من الأمور الهامة التي
رجوت سعادته أن ينقل لفخامتكم وجهة نظري
الكاملة بشأنها .

ولا يسعني في ختام رسالتي إلا أن
أؤكد فائق تقديرنا للموقف العادل البناء الذي
اتخذته المملكة المتحدة الصديقة في هذه الأزمة
الخطيرة التي لا تهدد أمن واستقرار منطقة الخليج
فحسب بل أمن وسلام ورخاء شعوب العالم
أجمع.

كما أغتنم هذه المناسبة للاشادة بما
بلغته العلاقات الثنائية المتميزة بين بلدينا من قوة
وتطور في مختلف المجالات بفضل التنسيق القائم

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

- ٥ -



بيننا وحرصنا على التشاور المستمر في الأمور
ذات الاهتمام المشترك بين بلدينا وشعبينا
الصديقين .

مع أسمى تقديري وفائق اعتباري .

صديقكم الوفي ،
خليفة بن حمد

خليفه بن حمد آل ثاني
أمير دولة قطر

قصر الدوحة : ٢٥ محرم ١٤١١ هـ
الموافق : ١٦ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ م



TRANSLATION

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CDP ②

Emir Hamid

Re Answer of
Kuwait's letter.

Brought back
by Alan Clark.

CDP
20/2



- 2 -

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In conclusion, I would like to reiterate our deep appreciation for the just and constructive position taken by the friendly government of the U.K. vis-a-vis this serious crisis, which does not only threaten the security and stability of the Gulf region, but also the security, peace and welfare of other peoples throughout the world.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my personal satisfaction for the growth and the enhancement of our distinct bilateral relations in various fields, due to the continued coordination and consultations between us in matters of mutual interest for our two friendly countries and peoples.

With my deep appreciation and high regards,

Yours Sincerely

*Khalifa Bin Hamad Al-Thani
Amir and Prime Minister
of the State of Qatar*

*Diwan Amiri: Moharram 25, 1411 A.H.
corresponding to August 16, 1990.*

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ١ -

فخامة السيدة مارجريت تاتشر
رئيسة وزراء المملكة المتحدة.

تلقيت ببالغ الشكر والتقدير رسالتك المؤرخة ٩ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ التي حرصت فيها على احاطتي بموقف المملكة المتحدة الصديقة ، والتدابير التي تعتزم اتخاذها ، بالاشتراك مع دول أخرى ، لضمان تنفيذ قرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي بفرض مقاطعة شاملة على العراق بغية إنهاء عدوانه على دولة الكويت واستعادة سيادة هذه الدولة الشقيقة واستقلالها كاملين ، وكذلك مشاركة القوات البريطانية في الجهد الدولي المشترك للدفاع الجماعي عن المملكة العربية السعودية والدول الأخرى المهددة في الخليج . وقد تطرقت فخامتكم في رسالتك الى ما قد يتطلبه ذلك من استخدام التسهيلات المتاحة في الدوحة من آن لآخر ،

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٢ -

بالإضافة الى أية مساعدات أخرى قد تقتضيها الظروف مستقبلا.

ومما لا شك فيه أن دولة قطر التي ساندت قرارات مجلس الأمن الدولي ، ومنظمة المؤتمر الاسلامي ، وجامعة الدول العربية ، ومجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية الصادرة في هذا الصدد ، ترحب بكل جهد بناء يرمي الى تنفيذ هذه القرارات ، وتأكيد الشرعية الدولية ، ووضع الارادة الإجماعية للمجتمع الدولي ، متمثلة في قرارات الهيئات المذكورة ، موضع التنفيذ .

وبناء على ما تقدم ، وادراكا من دولة قطر لالتزاماتها الدولية ، وعلى الأخص تلك المنبثقة عن قرار مجلس الأمن الدولي رقم ٦٦١ ، وميثاق الأمم المتحدة الذي يؤكد حق الدول ،

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



- ٣ -

فرادى وجماعات ، في الدفاع الشرعي عن النفس ،
فإننا نوافق على منح التسهيلات المطلوبة التي
قد تقتضيها الظروف مستقبلا .

من ناحية أخرى ، واستجابة لطلبكم
، فقد أصدرت تعليماتي الى وزارة الداخلية
بالمعاونة في تسهيل مغادرة البلاد لمن يرغب
في ذلك من الرعايا البريطانيين الى أن تنجلي
الظروف الطارئة التي تحيط بمنطقة الخليج في
الوقت الراهن.

وقد أسعدني أن استقبل في الدوحة
صباح اليوم سعادة السيد ألن كلارك وزير الدولة
لشئون المشتريات الدفاعية ، وأن أتبادل معه
وجهات النظر حول الوضع الخطير القائم حاليا في

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

- ٤ -



منطقة الخليج وموقف حكومتينا ازائه. وقد
تناولت مباحثاتنا العديد من الأمور الهامة التي
رجوت سعادته أن ينقل لفخامتكم وجهة نظري
الكاملة بشأنها .

ولا يسعني في ختام رسالتي إلا أن
أؤكد فائق تقديرنا للموقف العادل البناء الذي
اتخذته المملكة المتحدة الصديقة في هذه الأزمة
الخطيرة التي لا تهدد أمن واستقرار منطقة الخليج
فحسب بل أمن وسلام ورخاء شعوب العالم
أجمع.

كما أغتنم هذه المناسبة للاشادة بما
بلغته العلاقات الثنائية المتميزة بين بلدينا من قوة
وتطور في مختلف المجالات بفضل التنسيق القائم

بِسْمِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

- ٥ -



بيننا وحرصنا على التشاور المستمر في الأمور
ذات الاهتمام المشترك بين بلدينا وشعبينا
الصديقين .

مع أسمى تقديري وفائق اعتباري .

صديقكم الوفي ،

خليفة بن حمد

خليفه بن حمد آل ثاني
أمير دولة قطر

قصر الدوحة : ٢٥ محرم ١٤١١ هـ
الموافق : ١٦ أغسطس ١٩٩٠ م

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MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO AMIR OF KUWAIT

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
SHAIKH JABER:
BEGINS

IT WAS WITH OUTRAGE AND DISMAY THAT I HEARD OF THE INVASION OF
YOUR COUNTRY BY IRAQ. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE SINCE BEEN DOING ALL
WE CAN, WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND OTHER FRIENDS AND ALLIES, TO
REVERSE THIS MONSTROUS ACT OF AGGRESSION. I AM ENCOURAGED, AND
I HOPE YOU ARE TOO, BY THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE RECEIVED IN THE ARAB
WORLD AND BY THE SOLIDARITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE
RAPID PASSING OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 660 AND 661
DEMONSTRATES UNPRECEDENTED UNANIMITY AND RESOLVE ON THE PART OF
THE UNITED NATIONS TO COUNTER THIS AGGRESSION. I BELIEVE IT IS
VITAL THAT YOUR HIGHNESS' VOICE CONTINUES TO BE HEARD LOUDLY AND
CLEARLY ABROAD, REMINDING THE WORLD THAT THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT IS FUNCTIONING, EXPRESSING YOUR OWN
DETERMINATION TO RETURN TO YOUR COUNTRY AND URGING THE REST OF
THE WORLD TO CONTINUE ITS ROBUST SUPPORT AND ITS REJECTION OF
IRAQ'S AGGRESSION.

I OFFER MY DEEPEST PERSONAL SYMPATHY AND CONDOLENCES FOR THE
DEATH AND INJURIES AMONG MEMBERS OF YOUR HIGHNESS' FAMILY.

MARGARET THATCHER

ENDS

HURD

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KUWAIT/IRAQ: SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENTS.

SUMMARY

1. UN SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE ISSUE A CLARIFICATION OF A STATEMENT MADE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN LIMA.

DETAIL

2. A REUTER'S PRESS LINE, ISSUED ON 16 AUGUST, REPORTED THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS SAYING THAT 'MILITARY FORCE TO ENFORCE UN SANCTIONS ON IRAQ, WITHOUT SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL, WOULD BE A BREACH OF THE UN CHARTER' AND QUOTED HIM AS SAYING 'ANY INTERVENTION, WHATEVER THE COUNTRY, WOULD NOT BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH EITHER THE LETTER OR THE SPIRIT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.'

3. FOLLOWING THIS, THE UN SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

BEGINS

THE FOLLOWING IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE SPOKESWOMAN FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

CONTRARY TO WHAT PRESS DISPATCHES MIGHT INDICATE, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF TODAY IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN LIMA IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HE HAS BEEN SAYING FOR SEVERAL DAYS. A 'BLOCKADE' AS SUCH REQUIRES THE APPROVAL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE IT FALLS UNDER ARTICLE 42 OF THE CHARTER. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT NO TIME HAS USED THE TERM 'BREACH OF THE CHARTER'.

IN THAT CONTEXT, AS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID TO THE PRESS ON MONDAY WHEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE 'BLOCKADE',

'I UNDERSTAND THAT THE WORD 'BLOCKADE' FROM A UNITED NATIONS

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POINT OF VIEW IS NOT THE RIGHT ONE. WHAT WE ARE SEEING IS THAT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT, SOME DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, BRITAIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES - AND EVEN ARAB COUNTRIES - BUT NOT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. ONLY THE UNITED NATIONS, THROUGH ITS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, CAN REALLY DECIDE ABOUT A BLOCKADE. THAT'S WHY I THINK WE HAVE TO AVOID THE WORD 'BLOCKADE'.'

END OF TEXT

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HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
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MEETING RECORD



10 DOWNING STREET . .

LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

16 August 1990

Dear Sir

**PRIME MINISTER'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
SHEIKH SABAH OF KUWAIT**

After the usual opening exchange of courtesies, Sheikh Sabah said that he had just returned from a visit to Washington and wished to put to the Prime Minister the same question he had put to the Americans: was the operation only for the defence of Saudi Arabia or was it also to free Kuwait?

The Prime Minister replied that the forces that had gone to Saudi Arabia were there to protect the territorial integrity of that country and all of the Gulf States. Alan Clark was currently paying a visit to the Gulf States because the Bahrainis and the UAE had invoked the Treaty of Friendship. The frigates in the Gulf area were available to help them, and there was a possibility of a visit by our Tornado Squadron to Bahrain. If Sheikh Sabah was asking whether there was a military option to re-take Kuwait the Prime Minister's answer was that no option had been permanently ruled out. The first step had been to secure the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and to prevent Saddam Hussein following his seizure of Kuwait by further invasions. At the same time the sanctions flowing from the UN resolution were there to put pressure on Iraq. We were determined to see it through and there was no question but that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and that the duly constituted government of Kuwait should be restored.

Sheikh Sabah (somewhat truculently) said that this was not an answer to his question. Did the UK government need a formal request from the Amir to intervene militarily? The Prime Minister reaffirmed that we and the international community had taken firm action; that the logical sequence had been first to stop Iraq taking over other countries and second, to secure the effective implementation of sanctions. Our fleet was there to help in that process and thus ensure that Iraq was the loser from its invasion. But the Sheikh should be in no doubt that the forces were there for the defence of the Saudis and the Gulf States. The Prime Minister pointed out that many nations, particularly Moslem States, were assisting with sending troops. Other nations had responded well despite the economic cost; Turkey in particular had been marvellous. The sanctions resolution would secure its intended effect. The Prime Minister said that she readily understood Sheikh Sabah's concern about

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- 2 -

people in Kuwait. We too understood and shared that concern, particularly since there were many British nationals in Kuwait. She welcomed the diplomatic activity which Sheikh Sabah and the Amir were undertaking. It was important that the legitimate government should be active, and be seen to be active on behalf of the interests of the Kuwaitis and the citizens from other countries who were trapped in Kuwait.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Jane Binstead (Ministry of Defence).

Yours ever

Dominic

(DOMINIC MORRIS)

Simon Gass, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister²

16 August 1990

Dear Dominic,

To see. Van den Broek said much the same on Radio 4 this morning. He & the Dutch in Geneva have been the most helpful of the other Foreign Secretary's telephone conversation with the EC countries Dutch Foreign Minister

Mr Van den Broek telephoned the Foreign Secretary this evening to discuss the WEU meeting in Paris on Tuesday to discuss the Gulf crisis. The Foreign Secretary believes that the Prime Minister may be interested in an account of their conversation. DM

Mr Van den Broek raised the question of participation at the WEU meeting. The French were pressing for attendance as observers by EC members who were not members of the WEU. Mr Van den Broek understood that we and the Germans took the view that to exclude the Turks from attending in these circumstances would be unacceptable. Could we then agree that a meeting should be restricted solely to WEU members? The Foreign Secretary said that we could accept either this solution or attendance by observers, but including the Turks.

There was then some discussion of what the WEU should seek to achieve. Mr Van den Broek said that what was needed was a firm commitment on coordination of the forces of WEU member states going to the Gulf. For the Belgians, in particular, this was essential. The Italians and Germans, as well as the Dutch, also thought this important. We therefore needed a formula which blessed the best possible coordination. The Foreign Secretary agreed.

Mr Van den Broek continued that, in the light of recent developments, it might also be necessary for the Security Council to take another look at the implementation, and if necessary enforcement, of sanctions. This was not to imply any criticism of the position which had been taken by the US and UK. But the French had been striking a different attitude in a way which did not augur well for future WEU cooperation. In addition, Mr Van den Broek thought that the Iraqis would be only too happy if the UK or US was obliged to enforce the embargo. This would fuel pro-Iraqi and anti-US sentiment. There would be advantage if the WEU could achieve a consensus on how to take forward action in the UN. Ideally, the Security Council would agree that use of force should not be excluded in order to enforce the sanctions.

The Foreign Secretary said that we did not believe that at the time of SCR 661 it would have been possible to specify a blockade in order to enforce sanctions but it was very

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important that they should be observed. While we had no objection in principle to further Security Council Resolutions, the worst thing would be to try and fail. It was not clear that the support would be present for a further Resolution now. Accordingly, we did not think that the WEU should push for a Resolution which was not available.

Mr Van den Broek said that he understood this, although a further Resolution would solve a great many problems.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (MOD) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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London SW1A 2AH

2

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ms *James Lee* *[Signature]*

(S L Gass)
Private Secretary

Dominic Morris Esq
10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 August 1990

Dear Dominic

IRAQ/KUWAIT : RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

FCO Ministers have no comment on the ROE profile for the revised concept of operations for the Armilla patrol attached to Jane Binstead's letter to you of 14 August. We are clarifying one or two individual points of detail with the MOD at official level.

We are asking the MOD to ensure that any interceptions or other incidents are reported immediately to the FCO for passing if necessary to our Mission in New York.

I am copying this letter to Jane Binstead (MOD), Elizabeth Wilmshurst (Law Officers' Department) and Sonia Phippard (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely
Dominic Asquith

Dominic Asquith
 PS/Mr Waldegrave

Dominic Morris Esq
 No.10 Downing Street

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

16 August 1990

Dear Sir

Asquith

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Yours sincerely
Dominic Asquith

Dominic Asquith
 PS/Mr Waldegrave

Dominic Morris Esq
 No.10 Downing Street



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*Prime Minister**To see. I spoke to Alan Clark this morning. He is in good form & very pleased with the way the visit is going.**DM*

VISIT OF MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT : 15-16 AUGUST

SUMMARY

1. OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED. MUCH REASSURED BY MINISTER'S VISIT AS PERSONAL EMISSARY. AMIR RESPONDS FAVOURABLY TO PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER. NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. CONTENT TO LET UK FORCES USE QATARI FACILITIES.

DETAIL

2. HON ALAN CLARK, MINISTER FOR DEFENCE PROCUREMENT ACCOMPANIED BY VCDS, GENERAL SIR RICHARD VINCENT, 5 OFFICIALS AND 5 FROM THE UK MEDIA VISITED QATAR BRIEFLY FOR 24 HOURS FOR TALKS WITH THE AMIR, THE HEIR APPARENT AND QATAR MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OFFICIALS.

3. THE AMIR WAS IN AN EBULLIENT MOOD. HE WAS FULL OF PRAISE AND APPRECIATION OF 'HIS VERY CLOSE FRIEND' THE PRIME MINISTER AND WAS HIGHLY PLEASED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF 8 AUGUST. MR CLARK WAS HANDED A SEALED WRITTEN REPLY LATER IN THE DAY. THE AMIR SAID HE PROPOSED TO VISIT LONDON IN THE WINTER AND DISCUSS THE CRISIS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

4. THE AMIR WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL (''ASHAMED'') OF SOME OF HIS ARAB NEIGHBOURS AT THE ARAB SUMMIT AND TOTALLY CONDEMNED SADDAM HUSSEIN (CALLING HIM A FOX, LIAR AND A KILLER). HE MADE VERY PLAIN THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE KUWAIT GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO REQUESTED OUR HELP IN MAINTAINING A TOTAL BLOCKADE ON IRAQ AND TO STOP POTENTIAL LEAKAGE THROUGH IRAN. HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT SADDAM COULD NOT BE TRUSTED.

5. THE AMIR DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS ANY DETAILS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS BE FOLLOWED UP LATER. HE DID HOWEVER OFFER QATAR FACILITIES FOR OUR SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT.

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IN RETURN THE AMIR OFFERED INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY (PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN) IN THE AREA.

6. THE FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF WAS LESS SUCCESSFUL (PROBABLY A FEATURE OF THE COS' PERSONALITY) AND THE MAJORITY OF THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE GENERAL SITUATION. HE HAD NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR HELP. THEIR FEARS ABOUT CW HAD DIMINISHED FOLLOWING RECENT TECHNICAL BRIEFING. HE SHOWED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE STAGING OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN DOHA - MAINLY FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS.

COMMENT

7. THE AMIR WAS VERY FLATTERED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN AND WELCOMED OUR FIRM INTEREST. THIS HAS GONE DOWN VERY WELL AND HAS SET THE SCENE ADMIRABLY FOR THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PROPOSED VISIT ON 1 SEPTEMBER. HE SAID HE HAD MADE SOME CAUSTIC REMARKS ABOUT THE FRENCH 'BEING TOO LATE' TO THE FRENCH ENVOY WHO VISITED ON 14 AUGUST WITH A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MITTERAND. MR CLARK WILL REPORT IN FULLER DETAILS OF THE VISIT ON HIS RETURN.

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RETURN THE AMIR OFFERED INFORMATION ON POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY (PALESTINIAN AND JORDANIAN) IN THE AREA.

6. THE FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF WAS LESS SUCCESSFUL (PROBABLY A FEATURE OF THE COS' PERSONALITY) AND THE MAJORITY OF THE DISCUSSION COVERED THE GENERAL SITUATION. HE HAD NO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR HELP. THEIR FEARS ABOUT CW HAD DIMINISHED FOLLOWING RECENT TECHNICAL BRIEFING. HE SHOWED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THE STAGING OF BRITISH AIRCRAFT IN DOHA - MAINLY FOR LOGISTICAL REASONS.

COMMENT

7. THE AMIR WAS VERY FLATTERED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONCERN AND WELCOMED OUR FIRM INTEREST. THIS HAS GONE DOWN VERY WELL AND HAS SET THE SCENE ADMIRABLY FOR THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PROPOSED VISIT ON 1 SEPTEMBER. HE SAID HE HAD MADE SOME CAUSTIC REMARKS ABOUT THE FRENCH 'BEING TOO LATE' TO THE FRENCH ENVOY WHO VISITED ON 14 AUGUST WITH A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MITTERAND. MR CLARK WILL REPORT IN FULLER DETAILS OF THE VISIT ON HIS RETURN.

RICE
YYYY

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MDADAN 9669

Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

FM KUWAIT

TO FLASH FCO

TELNO 397

OF 161200Z AUGUST 90

INFO FLASH BAGHDAD ACTOR MODUK

INFO IMMEDIATE EC POSTS ME POSTS

① This is text of the advice that
the BBC are
broadcasting.

ADVANCE COPY

Fco say - it is virtually identical

K advice which US Embassy
- Kuwait has given to
their citizens.

MY TELNO 396: KUWAIT/IRAQ: FUTURE OF BRITISH COMMUNITY

② Mr Hurd is due back
at c 1800 hrs.

1. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, WHOSE COMMUNITY HAS ALSO BEEN REQUIRED
TBY THE IRAQIS TO MOVE TO ONE LOCATON, HAVE ALREADY ISSUED
ADVISE LOCALLY TO THEIR COMMUNITY. THIS IS NOW REACHED THE
EARS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY AND I AM THEREFORE ADVISING THE
COMMUNITY ON VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL LINES. THE TEXT WE ARE USING,
WHICH I HOPE THE BBC CAN BROADCAST URGENTLY IS AS FOLLOWS:

I have suggested
that as soon as he is briefed on
the position
he gives
you a
phone
call.

DM

QUOTE

THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES HAVE ADVISED US THAT, INORDER BETTER TO
PROTECT THE BRITISH COMMUNITY, THEY WANT ALL BRITISH CITIZENS
LOCATED IN ONE PLACE IN KUWAIT. THEY HAVE SAID THAT BRITISH
CITIZENS MUST MOVE TO THE REGENCY PALACE HOTEL ON 16 AUGUST.
THE IRAQIS HAVE STATED THAT IF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY DO NOT
MOVE VOLUNTARILY THEY WILL FACE UNSPECIFIED DIFFICULTIES
THE EMBASSY TAKES THIS TO MEAN THAT THE IRAQIS WILL TAKE
MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT BRITISH CITIZENS ARE MOVED TO
ONE LOCATION. IF YOU CHOOSE TO MOVE PLEASE TAKE ALL FOOD FROM
YOUR RESIDENCE WITH YOU TO GIVE TO THE HOTEL MANAGEMENT TO
HELP THEIR FOOD STOCKS. WE SUGGEST THAT YOU TAKE NO MORE THAN
ONE SUITCASE PER PERSON WITH YOU TO THE HOTEL.

UNQUOTE.

WESTON

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PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/PUS
MR TOMKYS
MR GORE-BOOTH
MR FAIRWEATHER
MR GOULDEN
HD/MED
HD/NENAD
HD/NAD
HD/EED
HD/SOVIET D
HD/SED
HD/UND
HD/ACDD
HD/CONSULAR D
HD/NEWS D
HD/NPDD

HD/SECPOL D
HD/AMD
HD/ECD(E)
MR PRIDDLE, DEPT OF ENERGY
MR W D REEVES CABINET OFFICE
MR D J GOWAN CABINET OFFICE
MR BARRASS, CABINET OFFICE
(BY TUBE H29)
PS/NUMBER 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADOCK,
(NO 10 DOWNING ST)
CABINET OFFICE DIO
(BY TUBE H29)
SIR ROBIN BUTLER, CAB OFFICE
AUS (C) MODUK
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FM BAGHDAD
TO FLASH FCO
TELNO 832
OF 161530Z AUGUST 90
INFO FLASH MODUK, WASHINGTON, EC POSTS

SIC ACA/U2H
YOUR TELNO 253 (NOT TO ALL)

POSSIBLE DETENTION OF BRITISH COMMUNITY IN KUWAIT
FROM DA INFO DI(ROW)A2 CRISIS CELL

1. AT LEAST 40 CIVILIAN BUSES HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED AT BAGHDAD CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION THIS EVENING. EN ROUTE BETWEEN WEST BAGHDAD AND BRITISH EMBASSY I SAW AT LEAST 12 CIVILIAN BUSES BEING MARSHALLED INTO A CONVOY BY POLICE. WHEN I APPROACHED BUS DRIVERS AT THE RAILWAY STATION AND ASKED WHAT BUSES WERE FOR I WAS TOLD THEY WERE TO BE USED BY THE GOVERNMENT FOR A SPECIAL TASK.

2. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THESE BUSES MAY BE BEING USED EITHER FOR AN EVACUATION EXERCISE, OR AS REQUIRED FOR REPATRIATION OF IRANIAN POW WHICH IS REPORTEDLY DUE TO BEGIN TOMORROW. HOWEVER THERE HAVE BEEN NO OTHER INDICATIONS IN LAST FEW DAYS OF PREPARATIONS FOR EVACUATION AND IF BUSES WERE FOR TRANSPORT OF POW THE RAILWAY STATION WOULD NOT BE AN OBVIOUS PLACE FOR THEM TO ASSEMBLE. THEIR LOCATION AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PREPOSITIONED TO TRANSPORT DETAINEES BROUGHT BY RAIL FROM BASRA.

WALKER

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DEPUTY HD/PUSD
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MR FAIRWEATHER
MR BERMAN
PS/NO 10 DOWNING ST
SIR P CRADDOCK 10 DOWNING ST
CHIEF OF ASSESSMENTS STAFF
(CABINET OFFICE)

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DEDIP

FM BAGHDAD

TO WASH FCO

TELNO 823

OF 161129Z AUGUST 90

MIPT: BRITISH COMMUNITY IN KUWAIT

(43) Passed Emergency UNIT ①/9A
 And also HA/MSB for Dir And

1150Z.

2975

Prime Minister

Two straws in the wind
 on Iraqi intentions for British
 citizens from Kuwait.

Jm

M

HAVE OBTAINED VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM A FRIENDLY
 EMBASSY (VERY SENSITIVE BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES IF
IT LEAKED AND THE SOURCE WAS SPOTTED, WHICH IT WELL MIGHT BE) TO THE
 EFFECT THAT A LARGE CAMP AT TAJI HAS RECENTLY BEEN EVACUATED
OF ITS ASIAN LABOUR FORCE INHABITANTS. THERE ARE SUGGESTIONS
THAT THE SAME HAS HAPPENED AT OTHER IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL/MILITARY
SITES.

2. THE UNPLEASANT THOUGHT OCCURS THAT JUST AS OUR CITIZENS
IN THE MANSOUR MELIA HOTEL MAY BE THERE TO LESSEN THE CHANCES OF
THE BOMBING OF BAGHDAD BY THE AMERICANS SO THE INTENTION IS TO
PROTECT INDUSTRIAL/MILITARY SITES BY ACCOMMODATING SIZABLE NUMBERS
OF WESTERN DETAINEES NEAR THEM.

3. I AM DELIBERATELY NOT REPEAT NOT COPYING THIS TEL TOKBMR WESTON.

WALKER

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FM WASHINGTON
TO DESKBY 170100Z FCO
TELNO 1955
OF 162358Z AUGUST 90
INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, RIYADH, CAIRO, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD
INFO IMMEDIATE ANKARA, MODUK, TEL AVIV, KUWAIT, ACTOR

ADVANCE COPY

SIC

PRESIDENT BUSH'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN: 16 AUGUST
SUMMARY

1. INITIAL ACCOUNTS SUGGEST THAT THE AMERICANS ARE ENCOURAGED BY HUSSEIN'S PERFORMANCE: HE DID NOT ATTEMPT A MEDIATION ROLE AND PROVIDED ASSURANCES ON SANCTIONS. DIFFERENCES REMAIN BUT RELATIONS PARTLY REPAIRED. DETAILED ACCOUNT PROMISED FROM GATES.

DETAIL

2. THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN LASTED OVER TWO HOURS, WELL BEYOND THE ALLOTTED TIME, WITH BUSH EXTENDING THE DISCUSSION BY ACCOMPANYING HUSSEIN ONTO THE PLANE WHICH TOOK HIM FROM KENNEBUNKPORT. AS A RESULT, BUSH AND HIS ENTOURAGE WENT IMMEDIATELY INTO A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER AND WE HAVE THEREFORE BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ONLY A BRIEF READOUT SO FAR. THE NSC HAVE TOLD US THAT A FURTHER ACCOUNT WILL BE PROVIDED BY GATES, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WHO IS LIKELY TO CONTACT LONDON DIRECT. MEANWHILE THE FOLLOWING COMES FROM WELCH (DIRECTOR NEAR EAST) AT THE NSC.
3. WELCH SAID THAT, CONTRARY TO ALL THE SPECULATION BEFOREHAND, HUSSEIN BROUGHT NO HIDDEN AGENDA, NO NEWS OF SECRET MEETINGS, SPECIAL REQUESTS OR MESSAGES FROM SADDAM. (BUSH HAS NOW CONFIRMED AS MUCH IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE: QUOTE THERE WAS NO INTERMEDIARY MISSION THAT I DETECTED AT ALL UNQUOTE.)
4. WELCH CHARACTERISED THIS MEETING AS BEING PRIMARILY ABOUT REPAIRING US/JORDANIAN RELATIONS, AND GETTING HUSSEIN SUFFICIENTLY BACK ON SIDE RATHER THAN A MEANS OF EXPLORING POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS. TO THAT EXTENT IT HAD BEEN A MODEST SUCCESS. THE TWO MEN HAD GOT ON WELL TOGETHER AND THE MEETING HAD TAKEN PLACE IN A BASICALLY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. HUSSEIN HAD BEEN NOTABLY AT EASE SUBSEQUENTLY DURING HIS OWN PRESS CONFERENCE WHEN DEALING WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, AS DISTINCT FROM EVIDENT ANXIETY WHEN

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QUESTIONED OVER SUBSTANCE. SIMILARLY BUSH HAD PUT A POSITIVE COMPLEXION ON THE EVENT IN HIS OWN REMARKS TO THE PRESS: QUOTE WE'VE HAD SOME GOOD MEETINGS HERE TODAY ... I THINK HE'D LIKE TO FIND SOME WAY TO BE HELPFUL ... I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TELL HIM THAT IN SPITE OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT MAY HAVE APPEARED TO BE GRIEVOUS A WEEK OR SO AGO, THAT ON THE PART OF THIS PRESIDENT, AND I THINK OF THE UNITED STATES ENTIRELY, WE'D LIKE TO SEE BETTER RELATIONS UNQUOTE.

5. WELCH SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN POSSIBLE MAINLY BECAUSE HUSSEIN HAD TAKEN A GENERALLY ENCOURAGING LINE ON SANCTIONS INCLUDING ON SHIPMENTS THROUGH AQABA. HE SAID THAT JORDAN WOULD COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS (THERE IS SOME DOUBT IN THE NSC AT THIS STAGE WHETHER HE ACTUALLY SAID QUOTE WAS COMPLYING UNQUOTE). AS WAS CLEAR FROM HUSSEIN'S PUBLIC REMARKS, THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT THE SANCTIONS COVERED, WHETHER HUMANITARIAN FOODSTUFFS WERE EXEMPT AND AT WHAT POINT SUCH EXEMPTION APPLIED. BUT WELCH ARGUED THAT SOME OTHER GOVERNMENTS ALSO HAD DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE AND WERE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE UN. IT COULD NOT BE DISMISSED AS AN ENTIRELY DISINGENUOUS POINT. HE THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT BUSH WOULD PORTRAY THE DISCUSSION ON SANCTIONS AS PROVIDING THE ASSURANCES THE AMERICANS REQUIRED (AS INDEED HAS BEEN THE CASE).

6. THAT SAID, THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED US OBJECTIVES AND HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE THEM THROUGH. HUSSEIN HAD NOT DISGUISED HIS VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD DONE THE WRONG THING, THAT ARAB OPINION WAS AGAINST THEM AND THAT AN ARAB SOLUTION WAS THE RIGHT WAY OUT. HUSSEIN WAS DEEPLY WORRIED. THE PRESIDENT HAD REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE COURSE HE HAD CHOSEN. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAD LOST ALL CONFIDENCE IN ANYTHING SADDAM HUSSEIN MIGHT SAY.

7. AFTER THE MEETING WITH HUSSEIN AND THE SAUDI, WE UNDERSTAND THAT BUSH IMMEDIATELY TELEPHONED PRESIDENT MUBARAK. INDEED THE ABOVE ACCOUNT WAS BASED MAINLY ON BUSH'S REMARKS TO MUBARAK, WHICH WELCH (PLEASE PROTECT) HAD MONITORED AS NOTETAKER.

8. FULL TEXT OF BUSH'S PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY FAX TO EMERGENCY UNIT.

MEYER

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